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“A young boy´s destiny is determined of who he hangs out with” 
   
                                                                  (Saying from the East in Husain 2009: 31). 
 
 
1.0 Introduction   
Terrorism has during the last ten years received a lot of attention, much as a result of 9.11 
2001. Since then, Islamist extremists have been considered the most important threat to 
international security, also in Norway (PST 2012). However with the attacks in Norway last 
summer, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) has started to pay attention also to 
other extremist groups, in particular Right-wing extremists (Ibid 2012). Also elsewhere in 
Europe there is a growing awareness concerning Right-wing extremism (Kuhlish 2011). 
     The 22th of July events and other terror attacks put prevention of terrorism at top of the 
political agenda (Justis & Politidepartementet 2011). However, until recently the main focus 
has been on how to catch most terrorists and extremist and send them to prisons (Bjørgo & 
Horgan 2009: 1). As this strategy proved to have little effect, a growing awareness emerged 
on the need to look beyond the security measures when dealing with terrorists and extremists. 
The focus changed, and alternative solutions in preventing radicalization, extremism and in 
the worst case terror attacks, emerged (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez & Boucek 2010). This has 
become known as various deradicalization programs (Ibid 2010), and in recent years we have 
seen a growth in number of organizations dealing with deradicalization efforts, partly due to 
the growing awareness around these issues within the United Nations, The United States and 
The European Union (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 1-2). 
     Despite the increased focus and attention on radicalization-processes as well as 
deradicalization, much research in this area is still needed. In particular as good and available 
data across countries, groups and programs are missing, making systematic comparison next 
to impossible. What causes some people to join radical/extremist groups to begin with? And 
how can the community help these people leave their extremist views behind? These are core-
questions in this thesis. Moreover, to what extent are the pathways to radicalization and 
deradicalization the same for different types of extremists? Does religion put a new and more 
complex dimension to these processes? Are Islamists extremists harder to deradicalize than 
Right-wing extremists? The purpose of the research is threefold:  
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1. What Explains Ways Into Extremism? 
2. What Explains Ways Out of Extremism? 
3. Are these processes different or the same for Islamists extremists as for Right-wing 
extremists? 
 
The three research-questions are investigated and attempted answered, and a general overview 
of radicalization and deradicalization is given. The latter two research-questions are however 
given the main emphasis, as a similar analysis between groups on deradicalization is lacking 
in the literature and because it is particularly interesting to see if religion makes it more 
difficult to withdraw from a radical group as this possibly could be interpreted as also leaving 
their religious beliefs behind. 
     Based on the literature on radicalization and deradicalization I expect to find factors like 
lack of identity, political grievance and personal victimization as central for the processes. In 
regard to this I have made several hypotheses that will be presented in the text. 
     To answer my research-questions and answer the hypotheses, I have interviewed nine 
(former) Right-wing extremists that all have been through some sort of deradicalization 
programs (efforts). I have also interviewed three experts on Islamist extremism Hanif Qadir 
(former member of Al Qu´ida) Rashad Ali (former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir) and Pat Parry
1
. 
In addition I am relying on secondary data-material that was given to me from Rashad Ali
2
. 
        First in this thesis I go through what terrorism is and how much of a problem terrorism is 
today. I also describe the radicalization process and which factors that is most relevant in this 
process, before I look at ways that can lead to deradicalization, as well as how 
deradicalization can be “measured”, success. I then move over to present the qualitative 
research design, its strengths and weaknesses and my own data, before I continue to the 
analysis. In the end I draw a summary and conclude. 
          The main findings in this thesis indicate that the religious aspect of ideology does not 
make it harder to deradicalize Islamist extremists. The Right-wing extremist ideology can be 
as all-encompassing as religion if they have been members long enough. This finding is an  
                                                 
1
 Hanif Qadir works at Active Change Foundation, Rashad Ali works at CENTRI and Pat Parry works at 
EMCCU, all in the United Kingdom. 
2
 I describe the interviews and the data material in section 5.0. 
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important step forward in the research evolving deradicalization.  
             
2.0 Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
2.1 Terrorism and Extremism 
Since September 11 2001 the focus on terrorism has been highlighted all over the world, and 
there is a growing consensus among countries that something has to be done in order to deal 
with the problem of terrorism (Fink & El- Said 2011). 
      Terrorism is a wide term and countries in the world today struggle to agree upon a 
common definition (Fink & El-Said 2011: 24). However, some components with the term are 
agreed upon, for example that terrorism is a pejorative term that refers to the enemy or 
someone who have different opinions than you. Terrorism can also refer to a variety of 
situations, and is used when referring to school massacres and suicide-bombers as well as 
people that kill doctors that work on abortion clinics, The Army of God. Terrorism can be 
both political and less political (Davies 2008: 5-6). In this thesis the focus lays on the political 
part of terrorism. Alex Schmid (2011) defines terrorism as: 
 
 “Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a 
special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other 
hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action 
without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and noncombatants for its 
propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties”                                                                                                                                     
 
                                                                                                           (Schmid 2011: 86).  
 
Terror, fear, dread and panic are central in terrorism and are shared by those who have 
similarities to the victims or identifies with the victims. Victims of terrorist attacks are mostly 
people who do not have any responsibility for the conflict that resulted in the terrorist attack, 
and are often civilians and defenseless people (Schmid 2011: 86). They are not the main 
target, but function as a propaganda based on fear, spread through the media. Terrorist attacks 
are mostly political in character and terrorists` goals are to achieve power by terrorizing a 
target population, but their motivation can be broad, from revenge, punishment and 
revolution, to the promotion of ideological, religious, political, social or national aims. 
Terrorists operate to create a state of fear, and attacks are rarely committed just one single 
time. The fear in the society that is formed when “expecting” or “waiting” for more attacks, 
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can create a climate in which manipulation of the political process gets easier for the terrorists 
(Ibid 2011: 86-87). 
     Since Schmids` definition is somewhat broad I will rely on the definition from the The 
Norwegian Police Security Service; PST, who defines terrorism as: 
 
 “Illegal use of, or the threat to use, power or violence against people or property, in 
an effort to put pressure on the countries authority or population or the society as a 
whole, to achieve political, religious or ideological goals”  
  
                                                                                                                       (PST 2012).  
 
    Terrorism is closely connected to the term extremism. Extremism is not pointing towards 
any specific political direction, but is rather a term to explain the tools that people can use to 
reach their political goal, these tools are very often of a violent character and are legitimized 
by the group (Handlingsplan Regjeringen 2010: 7). Desmond Tutu defines extremism as: 
 
“When you do not allow for a different point of view; when you hold your own views 
as being quite exclusive; when you don´t allow for the possibility of difference”   
                                                                              
                                                                                    (Desmon Tutu in Davies 2008: 4). 
 
 Extremism is therefore not only to take a certain thing to the extreme; it is also to deny other 
realities (Davies 2008: 4). Extremism is often connected to the acceptance of violence, threats 
or force to achieve political goals or to promote specific cases. This methodology can create 
fear and insecurity in a population (PST 2004). Extremism must however not be mixed with 
terrorism, every terrorist could be said to be an extremist, but not all extremists are terrorists 
(Davies 2008: 5). 
 
 
“Beware of extremism in religion; for it was extremism in religion that destroyed those 
who went before you”  
 
                                                         (The Prophet Mohammed, 570-632, in Husain 2007). 
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2.1.1 Types of Extremism   
Even though different kinds of extremism
3
 have in common their extremist views of the 
world, there are many different groups that exist within a state of extremism (Alsen 2005). 
The focuses in this thesis are on the Islamist extremists and Right-wing extremists. 
      In Islamism Islam is the big motivator and the ideology takes religion as its starting point. 
The common denominator is the aim to establish a state where the sharia laws are central. 
There are both non-violent and violent activists that struggle to reach this goal, but in this 
thesis the focus is laid on Islamists that use violent methods in their struggle to establish an 
Islamic state (Handlingsplan Regjeringen 2010: 10). In other words you can say that an 
Islamist is a person who wants the state and the states religion to be one unit, no separation of 
politics and religion (Rabasa et al 2010: 2).  
     Right-wing extremists on the other hand, have traditionally not used religion in their 
ideology
4
. Across Europe Right-wing extremists have, to some extent, come to mean different 
things, and a Right-wing extremist group in one country can have very different 
characteristics compared to a Right-wing extremist group in another county (Merkl & 
Weinberg 2003). However, the Right-wing extremists have certain features that can be similar 
between many of the groups, regardless of which country they are from. Right-wing 
extremism is for example often characterized by nationalistic, racist or Nazi attitudes, and 
some of them threaten to use, or use violence to achieve their goals (PST 2012). 
     Many of the groups do also have members that are involved only for social reasons, and 
these members stay away from the violent part. The groups often have a hierarchical 
organization, and members can strive to climb in the hierarchy (Bjørgo 2009: 30-31). 
Common for extreme Right-wing extremists is also the opposition against immigration 
(Merkl & Weinberg 2003).  
     In sum, extremism exists in different shapes and forms, yet the flavor of it is oftentimes the 
same, as is the potential threat these groups pose to the society at large. Thus, in the next 
section I look at how much of a problem these types of groups consists of, in cases where they 
chose to take it to the extreme, and revert to terrorism.  
                                                 
 
3
 In this thesis extremist and radical are used interchangeably, this means that extremist and radical in this thesis 
refers to the same thing; a person who accept the use of violence to reach different goals (PST 2012). 
4
 Anders Behring Breivik could however mark a change in this as he could be called a Right-wing Christian 
terrorist as much as Osama bin Laden could be called a Muslim terrorist (Juergensmeyer 2011). However, the 
people that I have interviewed in this thesis belong to the “old” version of Right-wings. This does not mean the 
really old Right-wing and their causes dating back to 50-75 years ago. It rather means the typical “skinheads” 
that can embrace a variety of different causes (Merkl & Weinberg 2003: 23), without including religious aspects. 
The ultra- nationalism could rather be one of the main driving forces for them (Ibid 2003). 
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2.2 How much of a Problem is Terrorism Today? 
The threat posed by extremist and terrorist groups can be affected of the international 
situation. We are entering a time with huge international changes, both in terms of economic 
decline in Europe, and regime changes in countries in the Middle-East. A number of countries 
can in the years to come experience an increase in poverty which again can lead to social 
instability in many countries (Alsen 2012). However, these effects have not come to affect the 
situation in Europe to a great extent, yet (Ibid 2012).  
     Today European countries seem to focus most on the threat posed by Islamist extremists as 
these groups have compromised the largest threats during the last years. Threat statements 
posted by Islamic terrorist groups indicate that these groups have a clear intent to commit 
attacks within countries in Europe (Te-Sat 2010). Increasing cooperation among terrorist and 
extremist organization in and outside Europe are also causing worries, in 2010 clear links 
were for example found between ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) and FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), and online communication makes the cooperation 
among such groups easier (Ibid 2010).  
     Despite the fact that the Islamist extremists have compromised the largest threats, other 
groups have also shown increased activity, for example Right-wing extremists. These groups 
have shown the will to enlarge and spread their ideology and are seen as a threat in many 
European countries (Ibid 2010). 
     Much effort is put on countering terrorism and in 2010 611 individuals suspected for 
terrorism activities were arrested in Europe, many of them were planning attacks in different 
European countries (Te-Sat 2011). Despite the efforts on countering terrorism 240 attacks 
were committed in different European countries during 2010, a total of seven people were 
killed in these attacks, which is a small number compared to the deaths caused by terror 
attacks in countries outside of Europe (Ibid 2011). However, if not a major problem Islamist 
extremism is still seen as the greatest threat to European countries in terms of terror groups, 
and the recruitment to some of these groups are increasing (Alsen 2012). 
     To get a better look at how big a problem terrorism is in the world today I present a 
general model with terror incidents per year grouped after regions in the world, from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD 2012).  
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Model 1: Terror Incident per Year Grouped by Regions in the World  
                                                                     
                                                          
          
          
         Source: Global Terrorism Database Data Rivers (GTD) 2012 
 
As we can see from this model there were a rise in terror incidents after 2001, and this can 
explain why the focus on countering-terrorism have been higher after 2001. The rise of events 
was greatest in the Middle-East and in South-Asia. Despite the growing attention of terrorism 
within media and among policy-makers all across the world since 9.11.2001, the figure 
actually shows that Western-Europe – are seeing less terror-incidents now than during the 
1980s and 1990s. The latter two years have seen a slighter increase though. 
     As the focus in this thesis is on extremist groups in countries within Europe, I present 
below more specific statistics from Europe in the period 20072010, showing the number of 
attacks and arrests in EU-member states in this period (Model 2) as well as a model showing 
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the most active terror-organizations (Model 3) in the same period. Both models are based on 
the Te-Sats reports from 20062011. 
  
Model 2: Number of Failed or Successful Attacks and Arrests in EU-member States from 
20072010 
                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Te-sat EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 20062011. 
 
In model 2 we see how many people which were arrested for terrorism related activity in the 
EU-member states from 2007–2010. 2,792 people were arrested, while 1,564 attacks were 
carried out in this period (Te-Sat 20072011). 
 
Modell 3: Number of Failed or Successful Attacks per Group in EU- Member States from 
20072010 
 
 Source: Te- sat EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2006 2011. 
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Even though the focus in Europe seems to have been on Islamists since 2001 we see from 
model 3 that Separatist and Left-wings committed most of the attacks in Europe in the period 
20072010. Attacks committed by Separatists happened mainly in Spain and France. ETA 
was one of the major groups. The focus on Islamist extremist groups in Europe can therefore 
be questioned as the Islamist groups compromises one of the groups with fewest attacks (8 
attacks). However, the attacks from the Islamist extremists often turn out to be the deadliest 
(Te-Sat 2006-2011). 
     Despite the high number of attacks carried out in Europe in this period, especially by the 
Separatists, most of these attacks only caused material damages and few were badly injured or 
killed as a consequence of these attacks (Te-sat 2006-2011). 
     As we see from these models major terror attacks are not that common in Europe, at least 
not attacks with high death rates. Nevertheless, there is a great focus on countering terrorism 
all over Europe since the threat could be rising. In the next section I look at reasons for why 
we want to counter terrorism and deradicalize those involved in extremist movements. 
 
2.3 Counterterrorism: Why We Want to Deradicalize Extremists 
To use terror to govern is something that began at the very first beginning of organized 
society, and throughout history power has wielded through terror by inflicting fear (Chaliand 
& Blin 2007). Examples of this can be violent extremism as massacres and the crusades 
(Davied 2008: 2). 
     Also in the 20
th
 century many countries were plagued by terror in different forms like the 
fighters in the anticolonial struggles, revolutionary left-wing and right-wing terrorists and 
ethnic separatist groups (Frey, Luechinger & Stutzer 2007: 1). 
     Despite terrorism and violent extremisms long history there have been a change in this 
area the last couple of year’s due to more advanced technology, and the increased speed of 
communication. There are new ways of spreading information and extreme ideas can reach 
out to whoever might be interested in no time. This can increase the likelihood for more 
international terrorism (Davies 2008: 2-3) and to counter terrorism is important because 
extremism and terrorism have both economic and social disadvantages, and; 
 
 “Individual and collective disengagement from terrorism may reduce the economic, 
social and human costs of terrorism” 
 
                                                                                          (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 247).  
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Extremism and terrorism can in a democracy be a threat to the democracy itself, as well as it 
can affect the national security and threaten different groups in the society (Handlingsplan 
Regjeringen 2010: 7). Terrorism is also indiscriminate; 
 
 “[…] aiming to cause mass causalities, regardless of the age, nationality, or religion 
of the victims […]”  
                             
                                                                                        (HM Government 2006: 1). 
   
    The increase of threats from extreme Islamist organizations have led many European 
countries to address the need for preventive strategies in order to cope with the problem 
before it gets any bigger, and many countries have developed deradicalization strategies 
aimed at Islamist extremists (Handlingsplan Regjeringen 2010). Especially the United 
Kingdom has a well- developed strategy to prevent radicalization and to help those who are 
already radicalized into extreme Islamists milieus to get out (CONTEST 2011). 
     In Norway the main focus has been on “preventive conversations” with people in the 
“danger-zone” for being radicalized into terror milieus and organizations and the police have 
had an increase in such conversations during the last couple of years (Strøm-Gundersen 
2011). 
     Below I look at some of the efforts that have been done in some European countries in 
order to counter terrorism. 
         
2.3.1 Deradicalization Programs 
A wide range of programs have emerged in different countries the last couple of years, some 
with great success, others with more unclear success rates (Ibid 2010). 
     Very few people are radicals, extremists or terrorists their whole life. Sooner or later 
people get tired of a life as an extremist and seek out of the milieu. To speed this process and 
make sure that the person who decided to leave the group does not reunite with it, the 
government can use different tools in the process (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 1). These tools are 
the deradicalization programs. Some of these programs have loose goals and are poorly 
organized and others are well organized with clear goals. Most programs have extremists and 
ex-extremists as their main target group (Ibid 2009: 5). The programs mentioned here will be 
of that kind.  
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     The core in the deradicalization programs is the aim to get people with extremist thoughts 
and practices out of their “unhealthy” environments, and the goal for most programs are the 
wish to make people that choose the wrong “track” with violent activities and unhealthy 
ideologies to disengage from these, and become “normal” and well-functioning people in the 
society (Fink and El- Said 2011: 1).   
     However, the programs vary after what kinds of problem they wish to resolve, but many of 
the main strategies are the same, mostly to get people to see for themselves that their views 
might be wrong, and help them to create a new understanding of life, as well as giving them 
support to establish a new life with a place to live and maybe a place to work (Handlingsplan 
Regjeringen 2010). 
     The programs can include many factors to help people disengage or deradicalize. Network- 
groups have been and are central in many of the programs. In these groups people can meet 
other people that are in the same situation. “Preventive conversations” with the police are also 
central in many of the programs (Ibid 2010). 
     To constitute a good deradicalization program, they have to have a “staff” that are well-
educated or know the situation well, for example former extremists, so that the extremists will 
gain respect for the people working there. It is also important that deradicalization programs 
are comprised of affective, ideological and pragmatic factors that is followed up after the 
individual leaves the program. Many programs sees the importance of including the 
extremists family as well, so that they can be a part of the process and help the individual 
after he/she is finished with the program (Rabasa et al 2010). 
 
Europe 
Many countries in Europe have programs that have been aimed at Right-wing extremists, as 
this has been one of the main problems in European countries. Today there is however an 
increasing establishment of programs aimed at Islamist extremists since this group is of 
growing concern in many European countries. In the establishment of the “new” programs 
experiences from the “old” ones are used (Handlingsplan Regjeringen 2010). 
     In Norway one example of a deradicalization program is the Exit-project. The Exit-project 
is a Norwegian program from 1997 that was aimed at Right-wing extremists, and many good 
experiences were made with this project (Ibid 2010). 
     The Exit project offered help to people that had a wish to get out of extreme environments. 
Through the Exit program the participants got individual guidance as well as they could meet 
other people that had a wish to establish a more “normal” life and disengage from the 
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unhealthy environment they were members of. One of the main factors in the program was to 
try to create a new environment for the people that wanted to disengage. It is important that 
the people, willing to disengage, gets a new social network so that they do not fall back to 
“old friends” when they are finished with the rehabilitation. It is also important to establish 
contact with the public authorities so that they can make sure that the disengaged person will 
get a job and maybe a place to live (Ibid 2010).  
     In developing deradicalization programs countries are drawing on experiences from each 
other, and Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands borrowed the ideas from the Exit program, 
which was basically developed in Norway (Handlingsplan 2010). 
     The Exit program started as a consequence of the increasing number of young people in 
Europe joining violent and right-wing extremist organizations during the 1990s (Bjørgo, 
Donselaar & Grunenberg 2009: 135). Concerned parents in Norway contacted the police and 
they worked together with professor Tore Bjørgo to establish the Exit project in Norway (Ibid 
2009: 136). The main thoughts behind the Exit project was to make more awareness and to 
develop strategies and methods among people who could be ”nearer” to the young people, as 
teachers, youth workers, child welfare officers and police officers. During the first three year 
period of the Exit-project more than 700 practitioners got trained in how to approach to 
different violent and racist youth groups (Ibid 2009: 136).  
     The parental network groups were one of the most successful parts of the Exit. In this 
network group concerned parents could meet with others parents who were in the same 
situation and they could share experiences on how to put restrictions on the youths and how to 
get them to disengage from the violent or racist environments (Ibid 2009: 136-137). 
     In 2003 the Norwegian police, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) and Exit 
started a new project, “preventive conversations”. In this project the youths that were 
involved in violent or racist groups could meet with the police and have conversations with 
them about how to disengage and why disengagement was important 
5 
(Ibid 2009). 
     In Sweden they borrowed the Norwegian Exit idea to establish their own deradicalization 
programs. In Sweden the main idea was that people who wanted to disengage could contact 
the Exit organization on their own initiative, in contrast to Norway where much effort was put 
in tracking target-people “down”. Many of the volunteers in the Swedish Exit are former 
extremists, and they use their own experiences and their knowledge about the different violent 
                                                 
5
 The “preventive conversations” was especially aimed at the racist organization Vigrid (Bjørgo, Donselaar & 
Grunenberg 2009: 138). 
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and racist organizations to help people disengage. Exit in Sweden also works close to the 
police, teachers, social workers and therapists (Ibid 2009: 138).  
     Germany also used the Exit program as inspiration for deradicalization programs for right- 
wing extremists. In Germany they established “Exit-Deutschland”. As in Sweden this 
programs main goal is to get extreme Right-wings to contact the organization themselves. 
Exit-Deutschland has a high focus on getting known through the media so that extreme young 
people will know where to go if they want to disengage/deradicalize (Ibid 2009: 142-143).  
 
The “Muslim World” 
In the “Muslim world”, one the other hand, most of the programs are aimed at radical 
Islamists. These programs takes place in prisons, where there is a high focus on theological 
dialogue as many of the Islamist have got a wrong understanding of Islam (Ibid 2010). These 
programs often combine assistance from psychologists and social workers, as well as 
theological dialogs and vocational training (Handlingsplan Regjeringen 2010). 
     Many of the countries in the “Muslim world” have also been quick to address the need for 
such programs, especially after September 11 2001; as a consequence many of the countries 
have got well established programs, which could offer guidance and re-education to the 
radicals. Former radicals are often included in this work, as they have a special insight into 
the radicals’ situation (Barret & Bokhari 2009: 170-173).  
     Countries in the “Muslim world” are also drawing on experiences from their neighboring 
countries and other countries with the same types of problems. It has also been important to 
focus on individuals and groups that are not yet terrorists, but are on their way into bad 
environments, and many countries have “preventive conversations” aimed at people in the 
“danger-zone”. The family is of special importance in this process with seeing “signs” of 
radicalism in a son or daughter. To discover people that are one their way to radicalization if 
of special importance since it is easier to deradicalize people that are not yet that committed 
(Ibid 2009: 173-175).   
     Even though many deradicalization programs exist today there have been problems to 
agree upon a common platform regarding measurement of success (Rabasa et al 2010). Below 
I look at the programs in the countries most relevant for this thesis and how successful they 
claim to be. 
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2.3.2 How Successful are the Programs? 
Measuring success with different deradicalization programs can be hard. Every program is 
designed in a special context and with different goals at eye, and can as a consequence be 
very different with different measurements for success, this will however be further explored 
later in this thesis.   
     Since Norway, Sweden and the UK are the main focus in this thesis I present more detailed 
information about their programs and how successful they have proven to be below. 
   
 
 “If a man reverts to violent extremism having been giving everything by the state, he 
attracts little if any public support, whereas if a man returns to violence because he 
has been tortured or otherwise mistreated he is likely to take others with him”  
 
                                 (Prince Mohammed of Saudi-Arabia in Fink & El-Said 2011: 14).  
     
 Norway     
As we have seen the Norwegian Exit project was established to deradicalize and disengage 
Right-wing extremists and people with connection to racists` milieus. In the project three 
different agents constituted the main program. This was the rehabilitation of radical youth that 
wanted to get out of the radical and extreme milieu, the parental network groups and the 
teaching of personnel in how to handle radical youths and the distribution of experiences and 
materials (Exit sluttrapport 2001).  
     The rehabilitation of youths was meant as a form of aid, to help the youths establish a 
“normal” life, a place to live, a job and new friends (Ibid 2001).  
     Parental network groups was also one of the components that constituted Exit. These 
network groups turned out to be a successful effort. From 1995-2000, 130 parents 
representing 100 youths were involved in these networks. In 2000 only ten of these youths 
were still active or members of radical and extreme groups and milieus. Not all of these 
youths left the milieu because of the parental network group, but this were probably one of 
the main reasons for several people (Bjørgo, Donselaar & Grunenberg 2009: 136-137). The 
     In the Exit project there was also a focus on the need to educate people that were in daily 
contact with the youths. The need for information turned out to be large and this effort was a 
successful one in the case that people learned more about what to do, what to look for and 
how to handle youths with connection to extreme milieus (Exit sluttrapport 2001).  
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      To summarize, the Norwegian Exit- project enabled to put extremism and the 
disengagement/deradicalization from it more on the agenda. It is however not possible to say 
how many people that have left extreme and radical movements as a consequence of the Exit 
project, this is impossible due to both fundamental and organizational causes. The goal was 
nevertheless that people would leave the groups before they got very involved in them, and 
before they committed any crimes. The ideas behind the Exit-project have caused interest in 
Sweden, Demark and Finland where they have tried to establish similar projects (Ibid 2001). 
 
Sweden 
In Sweden they borrowed ideas from the Norwegian Exit-project to establish their own exit-
program in 1998. The main thoughts are the same as in Norway but the Swedish model is 
different in the sense that individuals to a higher degree have to make contact with the 
program themselves. The “target” individuals in the Swedish program are mainly right- wing 
extremists, and if they contact the program they can get assistance in leaving their group and 
help to establish a “new” life. In 2008, 600 people had been through the program since its 
start in 1998 (Bjørgo, Donselaar & Grunenberg 2009: 138-139).  
     The Swedish exit has been able to disengage many people, but as with many of the 
deradicalization programs the participants are not followed up closely enough after leaving 
the program, so it is not possible to say for sure if all of the participants managed to stay 
disengaged/deradicalized (Ibid 2009). There is no data on how many people who left different 
Nazi-movements for good, but there are many indications on that people stay away from the 
former group, as disengaged people often are looked upon as betrayers by the remaining 
members of the group (Sandgren, Wikstrøm, Nur & Hallal 2010). There have also been a lack 
of competent people in the work with Exit in Sweden, the work staffs have lacked relevant 
experience and education, and this has caused some problems, nevertheless, Exit in Sweden 
seems to be functioning well, and much work is done to develop and improve the program 
further (Ibid 2010).  
  
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdoms` counterterrorism strategy is called CONTEST, and is one of Europe’s 
most developed strategies for deradicalization, and is aimed at Islamists extremists.  The 
strategy is built up by four components; prevent, pursue, protect and prepare and was 
developed in 2005. The prevent part of CONTEST covers the deradicalization area, the 
deradicalization programs (Rabasa et al 2010). In prevent the police works together with local 
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authorities and NGO´s (Non-Governmental Organizations) to find those who are vulnerable 
to radicalization and those who are already radicalized. The goal is to find them and challenge 
their ideas and views (Ibid: 2010). 
     The prevent part seeks to avoid that people get radicalized and join extreme milieus as 
terror groups. Assistance and support are given to those who are in such milieus to help them 
leave and establish a new life. The prevent is a cooperation between many sectors like 
criminal justice, education, charities, the internet and the health sector (CONTEST 2011). 
     The prevent part of CONTEST have had over 1000 people go through the program, and 
there are no indications that these people have returned to extremism or re-joined extremist-
groups, which is seen as one of the indications of success in this thesis. The government in the 
UK is working to develop the whole CONTEST strategy further (Ibid 2011).  
     On the street level there is organization as Active Change Foundation who is an 
organization that works to prevent violence between gangs and try to prevent people from 
engaging in violent extremism. ACF works close to young people in the community to 
prevent and confront violent extremism. They work to draw people out of violent radical 
milieus and provide new perspectives and a positive lifestyle (ACF 2012). 
     As we see the different programs can be hard to compare as they are somewhat different. 
This puts the collection of comparable data across countries, programs and groups at the 
forefront of the research agenda. As a modest and first attempt in this direction I have 
interviewed extremists from three different countries across two different extremists’ camps. 
Before moving into the more empirical part of this thesis, it is important to have a solid 
theoretical understanding of what leads to radicalization in the first place, which is the topic 
of the following section 
          
3.0 Radicalization 
A decision to join a radical movement can on the surface seem irrational as participation 
involves risks, especially if the movements are of a violent character (Wiktorowicz 2004).  
Yet, radicalization does happen within all types of totalitarian views of life and political 
ideologies from the extreme left to the extreme right (Berg 2012).  
     Radicalization is defined as a process were a person approaches and gets new and extreme 
ways of thinking about the society and the world, at the same time the limit for the use of 
violence to achieve what is looked upon as the “goal” gets lower and accepted (Rabasa et al 
2010: 1). How does this process happen? How can individuals take the step to support and 
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facilitate violence? What we know is that it is much easier to get involved in a group with 
extremists views than to disengage from it (Horgan 2009: 31), and many factors can lead to 
radicalization, but there are some factors that are more central than others as the radicalization 
process often follows a fixed pattern (Valk & Wagener 2010). Below I present different 
pathways to radicalization.  
 
3.1 Pathways to Radicalization 
There is no single root-cause which leads into radicalization (Bjørgo 2011), and there has 
been a lack of agreement in the literature about which factors and causes to give the most 
emphasis. However, some claim that young people with low income are often found to be 
more vulnerable to radicalization. Those who have experienced discrimination, racial or 
religious harassments, and people who see themselves as in conflict with other cultural groups 
are also found to be more vulnerable to radicalization (Roots of violent radicalization 2010). 
     To get a good overview over some of the factors that are most frequently mentioned in the 
literature about radicalization, I mostly rely on McCauley and Moskalenkos study on 
mechanisms of radicalization from 2008. 
     There have been trends to focus more on them – the radicals– rather than the context they 
are in, or the context they believe they are in (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008). McCauley and 
Moskalenko (2008) try to see the non-state actors in their context, and have identified twelve 
mechanisms that can lead to radicalization (Ibid 2008). Of these twelve mechanisms three are 
about radicalization of the “masses” (for example mobilization to war), these are: Jujisu 
politics, hate and martyrdom. Five concerns radicalization at group levels (for example the 
radicalization within an organization) these are: Extremity shift in like-minded groups, 
extreme cohesion under isolation and threat, competition for the same base of support, 
competition with state power and within-group competition.  The last four concerns 
individual motives for radicalization, these are: Personal victimization, political grievance, 
joining a radical group and joining a radical group for reasons of love (Ibid 2008).  
     I have from McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) chosen the factors that are most relevant 
for my thesis to show how radicalization can occur. I have chosen factors mainly from the 
individual level as this is the level that is most relevant for this thesis, the factors are: 
Personal Victimization, Political Grievance and Radicalization in Joining a Radical Group. 
     In addition I have also included two factors from Munton, Martin, Lorenc, Marrero, 
Guillamon, Jamal, Lehman, Cooper & Sexton (2011) since these factors, Identity Seeking and 
Rewards, Monetary and Status are found to have relevance for radicalization into both Right-
 18 
wing extremist groups and Islamist extremist groups. To clarify the factors leading to 
radicalization into both Right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism I present them in a 
model.  
     Since Identity Seeking may be the factor that has the greatest relevance this will be 
presented first. 
       
3.1.1 Identity Seeking  
Every human has a need to feel that they belong to a group, basic group identity.  Isaacs 
(1976) claim that basic group identity is important for two main reasons for every individual; 
“[…] his sense of belongingness and the quality of his self-esteem” (Isaacs 1976: 34). Isaacs further 
claim that this need for self-esteem and group pride can emerge into social and political 
clashes (Isaacs 1976: 36). 
     Common for both Right-wings and Islamists extremists when getting radicalized is the 
search for identity. Membership in different groups can reduce uncertainty about beliefs, 
feelings and behavior among the members and group identification is important for the 
establishment of social identity (Herriot 2007). 
     This need to seek a social identity can emerge after a personal event or crisis, where 
individuals are reevaluating their identity. Immigrants who have problems integrating into the 
new culture can for example have a need to reestablish their identity and can as a consequence 
join a radical group (Munton et al 2011). Joining a radical group can be a way to establish a 
new identity in both the sense that the individuals adopt the group’s views and thoughts and 
also in the way that they get a new social network (Horgan 2009). 
     When social networks within a group grows this can create an impression among the 
members that they are similar to each other, and this can again create a connection to the 
group and a stronger social identity (Herriot 2007).  
     When individuals are bound to a group they also compare their group, “in-group”, to other 
groups “out-groups”, and especially if there is competition between the two groups, negative 
feelings can evolve in connection to the out-groups (Dyrstad, Ellingsen & Rød 2012). A threat 
from the outside, out-groups, can further strengthen the unity in the group, the leader can gain 
more respect and an idealization of the norms in the group arises. In larger groups this 
cohesion is replaced with in-group identification, patriotism and even nationalism, but the 
threat from the out-group is the same as in small groups. This was especially the result after 
the 9/11 attacks in the United States with increased patriotism, increased support for the 
president and increased focus on American values (McCauly & Moskalenko 2008: 427). This 
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again enlarges the gap between the two “groups”, and can lead to radicalization. If conflicts 
between in-groups and out-groups escalate and involve prolonged violence there is a tendency 
that the groups become more extreme in the negative perception of each other, this tendency 
can escalate to the stage where the groups dehumanizes one another (Ibid 2008: 427-428). 
One example of this can be found in Anders Behring Breiviks statement in relation to his trial 
when he was explaining how he became radical, he said; 
 
 “In many of these cases I could have chosen to take the law in my own hands and 
hurt many of these Muslims, but I thought that it was not adequate, I looked at these 
people as animals”  
                                                                                                          (NRK 2012). 
 
     When negative feelings escalate the social identity within the group can become further 
strengthened, and the group can start to see itself as in conflict with the other groups. In 
conflict situations the identity within the group is strengthened more and the group wants to 
distinguish themselves further from other groups (Herriot 2007: 104-105).  
     This can be said to have been the case during the United States invasion in Iraq in 2003, 
Bush’s “war on terror” and the invasion resulted in a massive mobilization of radical Islamist 
movements. Radicals from other countries started coming to Iraq, and in the autumn of 2003 
Iraq had to admit that the US lead invasion had resulted in a flourishing of militant Islamism 
and a larger terrorism-threat in the country (Knutsen 2005: 263). 
     If a conflict grows the enemy becomes more general, everyone else outside of the group is 
the enemy, this can strengthen the social identity to become so strong that it becomes the only 
identity the individuals in the group knows (Herriot 2007: 104-105).  
     Right-wing extremists and Islamist extremists are united in the identity-seeking (Skjeseth 
2012). As for the Right-wings a search for identity could be important for engaging in the 
milieu. Very few are drawn to the milieu as a consequence of ideology alone, the social aspect 
is bigger and the feeling of belonging to something, group identity, as well as a will to rebel 
against the society. In the Right-wing milieus newcomers are also warmly welcomed and 
appreciated something that can make them feel that they finally are accepted and the identity 
and connection to the milieu starts to grow (Fangen 2001). 
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     Islamists can also join radical organizations as a consequence of identity seeking; this is 
the case especially for home grown terrorists
6
 which are the focus in this thesis. Second and 
third generation immigrants living in different European countries can have problems in 
sorting out their identity, they do not feel European as well as they do not feel a strong 
identification to the country were they have their roots. They can decide to join a radical 
group in their search for the identity that they feel they are lacking (King & Taylor 2011). 
     From the Identity Seeking factors I have created my first hypothesis: 
 
 H1: Individuals that get recruited to extremist movements lack a clear identity. 
 
     For both Right-wing extremists and Islamist extremist joining a group also means making 
different ties, and the longer a person stays, the stronger these ties become, and exit from the 
group becomes more difficult. Even though a person joined a radical group mainly for social 
and identity reason, the group’s ideology will be indoctrinated to the individuals, and they 
accept it because they have made social ties in the group. (Rabasa et al 2010: 42). This can 
apply to both groups, but most things fundamentally separate them, and religion is one of 
those things.  
     In times of modernization and changes in well-established social routines identities that 
used to be well-established can shrink. This creates a need to re-define ones identity and new 
ones are established (Huntington 1996) Religion can in many cases provide a good foundation 
for people searching for their identity; 
 
 “Whatever Universalist goals they may have, religions give people identity by 
positing a basic distinction between believers and non- believers, between superior in-
group and a different and inferior out-group” 
                           
                                                                                                      (Huntington 1996: 97). 
 
Religion also provides answers and can offer membership in small communities (Huntington 1996: 
97). The radicalization of young Muslims can in that way be a religious seeking that is also 
shaping their identity (King &Taylor 2011). Religion as a source for identity has a bigger 
potential to result in conflict than other forms of identity “sources”. This is because religions 
                                                 
6
 Home grown terrorists is a term referring to people, often second or third generation’s immigrants, who are 
radicalized and wants to commit terror-attacks in the country that they live in (King & Taylor 2011). 
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have in it a locked system of beliefs, and sees the belief system in other religions as 
threatening at all times (Ellingsen 2005: 313). Huntington (1993) claimed that religious 
differences are far more fundamental than differences in political ideologies (Huntington 
1993).  
     Religious differences have also been found to increase the likelihood for conflict. It is easy 
to see the differences between yourselves and others if religion is central to your identity, as 
well as the believers in the specific religion are afraid that other religions can pose a threat to 
their religion (Ellingsen 2005: 312-313).  
     Since religion can be a way of seeking identity as well as religion is a big part of the 
ideology in Islamist extremist groups I will take a look at the differences between the 
ideology in the two groups. 
     In Islamist extremist groups’ religion is a central part of the ideology, this is in opposition 
to Right-wing extremist groups where religion is not part of the ideology. Ideology represents 
the thoughts, categories, concepts and the mental framework different groups use when they 
see the society and the members of the society and how they are organized and function, and 
can be very important in a group (Valk & Wagener 2010). For the Islamist extremist religion 
constitutes a great part of this ideology, religion is defined as; 
 
“Religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-
lasting moods and motivations in human beings by formulating conceptions of general 
order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” 
     
                                                                                                 (Schmid 2011: 180-181). 
 
 
3.1.2 Ideology 
Groups or organization are mostly bound and motivated by an ideology. This ideology can be 
both political and religious, like Hamas for example (Drake 1998). 
     A very radical ideology tends to have an unrealistic view of the past as well as the future; 
this has however proved to be effective in the mobilization and indoctrination of members to 
the groups that holds that radical ideology. This happens because the radical ideology has a 
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huge comparative advantage over the ideologies that are more moderate, so in specific 
circumstances and frameworks mobilization proves to be easier
7
 (Steponova 2008).  
     Ideology can provide motivation for action in a group, as well as it can justify the use of 
violence in the way that the responsibility for the violent actions are put on the people or 
groups that are seen as the enemy, in that way the violence are justified by the ideology 
(Drake 1998). 
     An extreme ideology can unite different groups and cells in a society, and with different 
structural and organizational capabilities a precondition is made for the commitment of 
terrorist attacks by the militant non-state actors (Stepenova 2008: 25-27). Since ideology can 
be a way of seeking identity I look at the ideology on the two groups below. 
 
3.1.3 Right-Wing Extremists and Their Ideology 
The Right-wing extremist milieus are in Norway today characterized by a lack of leader-
figures and a common ideology (Alsen 2012). The milieus do not have one common ideology 
but are united in racist, nationalistic or Nazism attitudes, where the most extreme of them are 
willing to use violence to reach their goals (PST 2012). They are also united in the opposition 
against immigrants who is said to “steal the nation’s future” and some believe that the white 
race can be extinguished if white and black people “mix” (Eiternes & Fangen 2002: 79-80). 
To prevent this some can mean that it is important that people stay in their own countries so 
that ethnic homogeneity is maintained. They can claim that they do not have anything against 
people with different skin-colors, but they do not want them within their country´s borders as 
this can cause disagreements among the different ethnic groups. Some of the most extreme 
movements can also claim that people have an instinctive and aggressive conduct against 
people with a different race than themselves, and in that way violence is something natural 
that can rise in confrontations among different ethnic groups, and to excuse violence is 
therefore not necessary (Fangen 2001: 156-168).  
     The Right-wing extremists are divided into many groups that can have different 
ideological orientations and lifestyles. They have different characteristics that are special for 
the different groups. Some can be very militant, some find each other through music and 
others are united primarily through the ideology (Fangen 2001: 76). 
     Even though there is a lack of a common ideological platform, there are in the most 
extreme milieus ideologies and theories that can come to be extremely dangerous. Extremely 
                                                 
7
 “i.e. in the framework of asymmetrical confrontation at the localized or transnational levels” (Stepanova 2008: 
21). 
 23 
committed Right-wings can have an ideology that can reach very deep and be so all-
encompassing that it eventually escalates into an extreme conviction; this could especially be 
the case for believers in the ZOG theory (Eiternes & Fangen 2002). The ZOG, Zionist 
Occupation Government, theory is a theory that is based on the belief that Zionists are ruling 
and controlling the world. To understand this theory the Right-wings claim that you need to 
study it deeply, only after a period with long studies one can see how everything is bound 
together. When this theory is fully imprinted the Right-wings sees everything, from news to 
different kinds of information, in the light of the theory (Eiternes & Fangen 2002: 60-61). 
     The ZOG theory can become a strong theory for some of the Right-wing extremists and 
some believers in the theory can be so committed that they are willing to die for the cause. A 
strong belief in the cause can also take away the barriers for the commitment of violence. The 
ZOG theory is creating a view among the Right-wing extremists that everyone is in 
opposition to them and that they are in war with the rest of the society, they can develop a 
large suspicion against everyone and everything. The Right-wing milieu creates a collective 
notion among the members that they belong to something that is in opposition to the rest 
(Eiternes & Fangen 2002: 62), conflict with an out-group. 
     If one comes to believe in an ideology such as the ZOG theory, the belief can become a 
conviction as one has used so much time learning about it and getting convinced by other 
members. If the conviction is extreme enough Eiternes and Fangen (2002) claim that it can be 
as strong as the conviction to those that are religious fundamentalists (Eiternes & Fangen 
2002: 60). This is however not the most common situation when believing in Right-wing 
extremist ideology as supporters of these different ideologies often are less aware of the 
ideology than they give impression of. Ideology can for them be something not-formulated 
and not- admitted (Fangen 2001).  
     To become a member of a Right-wing organization there is no demand that you know 
much about the ideology and can argue well for it, the only thing that is demanded upon 
membership is that the person sees herself/himself as a nationalist or national socialist 
(Fangen 2001). But there can be a certain pressure to accept the ideology without asking 
questions about it. Many of the new members do so to get socially accepted (Eiternes & 
Fangen 2002: 95), but in many of the milieus the extreme thoughts and ideas are not even 
well established or even well thought through. Among the members there is often a lack of 
knowledge around Right-wing extremist ideologies, and in Valk & Wagenaars (2010) 
analysis they found that not one of the people they interviewed in their analyses joined a 
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Right-wing movement only as a consequence of the group ideology, others factors had much 
more to say, like the social aspects (Valk & Wagenaar 2010). 
     In the milieus there are also surprisingly few discussions around ideology and it is 
impossible to find a common ideological platform for the whole Right-wing milieu (Fangen 
2001). The limits for getting accepted in the different groups are very low, something that 
enables people with a poor social network to become fully accepted members (Fangen 2001: 
134).  There is also room for many different “isms” in the organizations, this enables the 
groups to get more support, as they accept many different kinds of people, and fight against 
what seems to be the most important issue; different antiracist and communist groups. The 
community and the group identification are to a large extent formed by the different groups 
that the Right-wings are in opposition to (Ibid 2001). 
     The Right-wings ideology are in continually change, and they can change their meaning to 
suit  better what the media writes about them for example (Ibid 2001). Despite their common 
extremist character the Right-wing extremist and the Islamist extremists have very different 
ideological perspectives.  
 
3.1.4 Islamist Extremists and Their Ideology 
There has, during the last couple of years been a tendency in the Muslim world to connect 
ones identity to that of religion instead of territorial and ethnic criteria’s. Gilles Kepel (In 
Huntington 1996) states; 
 
 “Re-Islamizaton ´from below´ is first and foremost a way of rebuilding an identity in 
a world that has lost its meaning and become amorphous and alienating”  
 
                                                                                                      (Huntington 1996: 98). 
 
When the identity is connected to that of religion an individuals´ core values are shaped by 
the religion, which defines what is good and bad. The believers can also see their religion as 
superior to other religions, which again can increase the likelihood for conflict between 
holders of different religions (Scott 2000: 1-2). 
     Religion is an ideology (Ibid 2000: 2) and Islamists extremists mix both political and 
religious aspects in their movements (Vogt 2005). 
     These Islamic movements can take a wide range of forms, most often the movements are 
socio-political that strives to get reform in their own country. Some Islamic movements, like 
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the Muslim Brotherhood or Jamaat-e-Islami, are willing to work within their own state and 
the system to change and reform it, other more radical Islamic organizations are willing to use 
“violent jihad” (holy war) to achieve their goals. Among the Islamic movements the focus and 
priorities can be different and the alternative with holy war is a priority for relatively few 
groups (Stepanova 2008: 61). The most radical groups and movements are however the focus 
in this thesis. 
     There are many common features among the movements, many of the Islamic 
organizations are for example marked by disruptions and are weakened by poor leadership 
and lack of agreement, however many extremist groups are gaining new strength and are 
united in the ideology and the ultimate goal about the Islamic state (Vogt 2005). 
     The goal about the Islamic state is a central point in the ideology. The state is to be bound 
by religious rules, the sharia laws and critic against democracy has been common among 
ideologists, but this can vary among different groups. The goal is not only an Islamic state, 
but also to develop an Islamic economy and to develop Islamic science (Vogt 2005).  
     During the last couple of years there has been a growth in the Islamic world when it comes 
to political ideology that is inspired by Islam. The ideology absolves terrorism as a 
mechanism for achieving what is seen as the ideological goals, and is often spread through the 
internet. The internet also enables indoctrination and training. (Schmid 2011: 4). People 
inspired by this ideology are not united in one large organization, but they feel solidarity for 
each other due to their common vision, and they share the political thoughts as well as the 
violent methods (Knutsen 2005: 252). 
     For some Islamic movements the Islamic ideology can get so all-encompassing that they 
go to the step to commit acts of terrorism to achieve what they see as Islamic goals (Rasch 
2005). The preachers of the ideology in these movements claim that it is the rest of the society 
that has moved away from the main principles in the faith and strives for a return back to the 
“old” and original values and practices. The way back to the original principles would be a 
road with stricter religious rules, and for extremists this road can be shortened by using the 
means of “holy war” (Stepanova 2008: 62).  
     This kind of radical ideology is not bound to any specific geographic area; the ideology is 
a non-state ideology that only distinguishes between believers and non-believers. For 
believers in the radical ideology God is the only ruler in the world, and this includes all 
national-states whether they are Muslim or not. The religious ideology can therefore not be 
associated with nationalism (Stepanova 2008: 156). Acts of violence and terrorism are 
glorified throughout the faith, and even defeat can, with basis in the ideology, be seen as a 
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spiritual triumph, because even entering the battlefield is seen as a victory and a contribution 
to the jihad (Stepanova 2008: 98-99). Abdullah Azzam who has been an Islamist activist and 
supporter of global militant jihad and is also said to be the founder of Hamas, said this about 
how militant confrontation in name of religion should be; “Jihad and the rifle alone: no 
negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues” (Esposito 2002: 7). 
     The radical religious ideology can among Islamist extremists groups have a huge appeal 
and can be spread to different movement all over the world. The ideology inspires people 
throughout the world to join different radical cells that can use violence and in extreme cases 
self-sacrifice to get closer to their goal (Stepanova 2008: 154). Such radical religious and 
fundamentalist cells can achieve great political impact in the way that they can reshape social, 
personal and public behavior (Huntington 1996: 96). 
     The interdependence between the radical organizations and their extremist ideology is also 
a relatively extraordinary one. The Islamist ideology has a huge structural effect on the 
movements, much greater than the movements have on the ideological structure. In the 
movements with the most radical ideology all aspects of structure is tightly bound to that of 
its ideology (Stepanova 2008: 161). 
     It is not so that Islamic extremists and terrorists exploit their religion for political 
achievements; it is more so that they use politics to obtain a religious goal (Rasch 2005) and 
to defend ones faith is a religious duty and some can sacrifice their life for their religious 
beliefs. To preserve the faith it can be necessary to kill those who are in opposition to it 
(Herriot 2009).      
     When ones identity is strongly bound to Islam, opposition and especially attacks on the 
religion is by the believer seen as an attack on him/herself as a person, and creates a need for 
them to defend themselves (Ibid 2009). A terror attack can in that way be justified by 
upgrading the attack to a faithful action and an action of revenge (Stepanova 2008: 64). 
Islamists are in these cases acting on the behalf of God. The status as a martyr and reward in 
heaven is central and can be seen as a motivation for people to become hijackers for example 
(Herriot 2007). 
     Even if religious extremism and fundamentalism establish the base for the ideology in 
many radical Islamic movements, the religious extremism can go beyond theology and 
religion to make room for political, economic and social aspects in the ideology, this is the 
case especially for Islamic extremists as they strive for a societal organization where politics, 
religion, the state and the society are one unit (Stepanova 2008: 59). However there is a rule 
among Islamist movements about not distinguish between politics and religion, this reflects 
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the all-encompassing character of Islam, where all aspects of life are covered in a much 
greater extent than in other religions (Ibid 2008: 66). 
     For people active in terrorist networks their ideology seems to be more indoctrinated, than 
for people in other extreme organizations, and they are truly committed to their ideology and 
willing to sacrifice their lives in terrorist attacks for the case they believe in. However, the 
ideologies tend to be less advanced and sophisticated, and its followers do not understand all 
the aspects of their extremist ideology (Ibid 2008). The ideology becomes first and foremost 
the members identity and people that struggle to define themselves are drawn to the 
fundamentalist and radical movements, Huntington (1996) claims; 
 
 “Fundamentalist movements, in particular, are a way of coping with the experience 
of chaos, the loss of identity, meaning and secure social structures created by the 
rapid introduction of modern social and political patterns, secularism, scientific 
culture and economic development” 
 
                                                                                                     (Huntington 1996: 98). 
 
The fundamentalist movements that best can respond to these feelings of chaos attract most 
people, and these movements are often able to answer basic human questions (Huntington 
1996: 98). 
     In these fundamentalist movements anger and fear of the West, allied in an religious and 
inspirational ideology can motivate anyone, from a farmer in the Middle East to a PhD 
student, to commit violent attacks to defend their religion and to do what is seen as their 
religious duty (Harriot 2009: 84). But the religious ideology goes further than just a 
confrontation with the West; the ultimate goal is to; 
 
 “[…] establish the Sovereignty and Authority of God on earth, to establish the true 
system revealed by God” 
 
                                                                                                    (Stepanova 2008: 155), 
 
 and to achieve this, “jihad” could for some of the most radical Islamists be seen as a solution 
(Ibid 2008: 155). 
     Movements that holds an ideology that is inspired by religious extremism also has a much 
clearer picture of who the enemy is than other kinds of extremist groups that do not hold an 
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ideology that is inspired by religion (Stepanova 2008: 65). It is easier to spot the ones that are 
different from themselves, Huntington (1996) said; 
 
 “Religion gives people identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and 
non- believers, between superior in-group and a different and inferior out-group”  
 
                                                                                                     (Huntington 1996: 97). 
 
Movements that hold an ideology with religious extremism can for example wish to “fight all 
the infidels”, this can apply to all people that do not believe in the same as they do, Arabs or 
non- Arabs, nationals or foreigners, in that way it is painted a very clear and wide picture of 
who the enemy is, mostly all that do not share the movements belief. The enemies are not 
reduced to certain groups or a handful of people
8
, but can be the West or the whole world of 
infidels (Stepanova 2008: 65).  
     The relevance of ideology for terrorist groups has during the last couple of years increased 
as a consequence of changing structural patterns and especially the spread of networks and 
their features. For different networks and their structures, a shared ideology with common 
goals plays a significant role, and tie different networks together as one movement in the 
unification of one shared ideology (Stepanova 2008).  
     This ideology is to a large extent of a religious character. Huntington (1993) claimed that 
religion is likely to fill the place of a missing identity-feeling when economic modernization 
and social change in the world are splitting people from what used to be their identity. 
Religion in this form is more likely to be of a fundamentalist character
9
 and those who 
subscribe to it are often young, highly-educated and middle-class people. Religion creates the 
basic platform of identity that unites people across national boundaries (Huntington 1993: 
26). 
     When identity and ideology is bound to religion it is also easier to get an “us” versus 
“them” view of people belonging to other religious groups (Huntigthon 1993: 29), and this 
can again increase the chances for conflict (Herriot 2007). 
                                                 
8
 This is in clear opposition to the Right-wing extremists that usually hold special groups like immigrants or the 
Jews for hatred (Fangen 2001). 
9
 Fundamentalist Islam is distinguished from mainstream Muslim faiths in the way that the fundamentalists see a 
closer connection between religion and politics; they want the state to be religious and the implementation of the 
sharia laws (Herriot 2009). They follow the holy book directly but are selective in what parts they choose to give 
most emphasis. Different ideas are chosen as more important (Ibid 2009: 2). Fundamentalist groups are often 
characterized by their opposition to modernity and democracy, theocracy is preferable (Ibid 2009: 3-4). 
 29 
     The longer the people are members of the radical group the more radical their ideology 
becomes (Munton et al 2011: 15). To cope, weakening or undermining such an extreme 
religious ideology there is a need for an ideology that is as strong and powerful as the 
religious ideology and has in it the power of persuasion. The ideology of state actors tend 
however to be modernized, passive and moderate compared to radical religious ones, and 
competition between them is therefore hard. So in matters of ideology the international 
system and the state can lose compared to the radical ideology (Stepanova 2008: 153-154).  
     In connection to this section I have made my second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Ideology can be a good source to identity. 
     
     3.2 Political Grievance 
Individual radicalization can also happen as a consequence of political events or trends 
(McCauley & Moskalenko 2008). The political grievance can for Islamist extremists be anger 
towards the West, especially anger towards the United States and its role in the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq
10 
(Munton et al 2011).    
     Political grievance can also be connected to situations involving jobs. Henrik Urdal (2006) 
finds that if young people with high education do not get jobs, this could especially be the 
case in countries with economic decline, it could lead to anger and radicalization becomes a 
“solution” to the problem for the well-educated, but unemployed people (Urdal 2006).  
     This leads me to the term relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is a term that can be 
connected to grievance in the way that individuals could have a mismatch in what they 
believe they can “get” and what they actually “get”, if what they get is not as good as they 
hoped for, it can create a state of frustration and grievance (Gurr 1970). 
      It is however important to note the difference between unrealized ambitions and 
unrealized expectations. Where the unrealized ambitions create feelings of disappointment the 
unrealized expectations will result in feelings of deprivations, which is harder to take than a 
feeling of disappointment. Deprivation is often intolerable, and can have more severe 
consequences. The individuals that experiences the deprivation feels impelled to remedy, by 
whatever means are available, the material and psychic frustrations is produced in the 
individual, and can create aggression. Deprivation can in that way serve as a catalyst for 
revolutionary action (Ibid 1970). 
                                                 
10
 Criticism and anger against the West and the US, and their foreign-policy, is not in any case unique for 
Muslims or extremists (Munton et al 2011: 17). 
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     Relative deprivation can cover a wide range of issues from welfare values, economic 
issues, power and status (Ibid 1970: 25-27).  
     The economic issue can be relevant for the point made by Urdal (2006): individuals with 
high education that do not get jobs, can feel a growing frustration that eventually can escalate 
into aggression (Urdal 2006). If the aggression grows further it can result in violence. 
However, this does not mean that frustration must lead into violence; it is only if the 
frustration is felt over a long period of time that the likelihood for aggression emerges (Gurr 
1970: 36-37). 
     Political grievance in connection to relative deprivation can also be the ability to vote, to 
take part in decision making and the ability to participate in the political elite. If the society is 
an unstable one, these abilities can be lacking and this can escalate into frustration (Gurr 
1970: 25-26).  
     The chances for a violent result of the relative deprivation increases in relations to the 
intensity of the discontent, and in situations where the discontent is very large it can result 
into mass violence or revolutions (Ibid 1970).  From this I have created my third hypothesis, 
 
H3: Experiences of grievance can make it easier to get radicalized. 
  
3.3 Personal Victimization 
In the psychological literature there exist evidences that supports both individual 
characteristics and situational factors in shaping individuals behavior, and in the literature 
regarding radicalization there is an agreement on that situational factors, of negative 
character, to some extent shape how individuals think, which ultimately can lead to 
radicalization (King & Taylor 2011). Especially if people have been in situations where they 
have experienced violence, traumatic loss of family members or bad personal experiences in 
matters of treatment it can make them more susceptible to embracing violent ideology 
(CENTRI 2012). This can result into the wish to revenge (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008).  
     The Chechen Black Widows are seeking revenge against the Russians due to experiences 
of death and rape among their menfolk. Another example is the Palestinian suicide terrorists 
that can seek revenge over IDF, Israeli Defense Force, for their attacks on their homes and 
loved ones. Grievance can in this sense shape and harden people so that they decide to use 
violence as a political tool (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008: 418). Personal victimization can 
also be felt by immigrants living in the West that experiences racist attitudes and oppression 
against them, the urge to revenge can then become central to them (Munton et al 2011: 18). 
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The urge to revenge may also arise as a consequence of how individuals, ethnic or national 
group are treated (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008). Immigrants can for example see the 
worldwide oppression against Muslims and consequently feel an urge to revenge (Munton et 
al 2011).  
     Earlier experiences and traumas are also dealt with in Dyrstads (2012). In this article 
Dyrstad finds that people that have had traumatic experiences and as a consequence 
developed Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), appear more authoritarian than others. These 
authoritarian values can be clear several years after the traumatic incidents, or in Dyrstads 
(2012) example, after the war. This indicates that how a person are able to deal with traumatic 
events to a large extent affects persons value orientation later in life, and if the traumatic 
events are not dealt with this can lead to authoritarian value orientation (Dyrstad 2012). 
     I have now presented some examples as to how personal victimization can happen. 
However, data is lacking on the area and how many terrorists and suicide bombers who joined 
the cause due to personal victimization are hard to come across, nevertheless, victimization is 
an important factor on the way to radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008).  
     In connection to this section I have formed my forth hypothesis: 
 
H4: People that have experiences with personal victimization can easier get radicalized. 
 
 
     3.4 Radicalization in joining a radical group 
 Joining a radical group is the path to radicalization that has got the most attention in 
theorizing about terrorism. It means that individuals are recruited to terrorist groups or other 
radical groups. This recruitment often happens by friends, lovers or families since the ones 
that recruit want to recruit people that they trust (McCauley & Moskalenko: 2008). The 
factors romantic and comradely love can be a very strong factor in the process of joining a 
radical group; it can even be as strong as the political aspect. When friendship is strong this 
can lead to a group of friends joining the radical group together. After joining a radical group 
the love for friends within the group and their common goals and threats increases and the 
group cohesion is enlarged. Group solidarity and a common goal are found to be one of the 
strongest factors holding radical groups together (Ibid 2008: 421-422). In addition to this I 
have formed my fifth hypothesis,  
 
H5: Prolonged membership in a radical group makes the individuals more radical. 
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3.5 Rewards, Monetary and Status 
These are factors that have been found to have relevance for the radicalization process, 
especially for Islamists. Rewards can create motivation for further involvement. The rewards 
are common for members in terror networks and can be salaries, rewards when operations are 
successful and money for the member’s family. The rewards can also take form as high status 
in the community, honor, power and the promise for a good afterlife in paradise for the 
individual and his/hers family (Munton et al 2011). Status is a factor that is mentioned in 
relation to radicalization of both Right-wing extremists and Islamist extremists. Especially for 
the Right-wings status can be important in the way that they, when entering the radical milieu, 
experiences that people who could bully them before now are afraid of them (Exit sluttrapport 
2001). From these factors I have created a model. 
     
Model 4: Main Factors Leading to Radicalization into Right-Wing Extremism and Islamist 
Extremism
11
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                           
    Radicalization 
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 Radicalization in joining a group and Rewards, monetary and status are factors that also can increase 
radicalization after involvement in a radical group. 
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The factors for radicalization presented here are not the only ones that have relevance for 
radicalization. There are several and diverse pathways active in the process with radicalization 
and these pathways can change among different individuals (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008: 
429).  
     To get an even better understanding of the processes at work in a radicalization process I 
take a closer look at factors that are relevant in the process and decision to join a radical 
group, some of these are overlapping the factors I have already gone through, and some not.       
     Wiktorowicz (2004) identifies four main processes for an individual to join a radical 
group. Wiktorowicz processes are based on studies of Islamist extremists, but I have 
developed his points and his diagram to apply to both Islamist extremists and Right-wing 
extremists. I present the diagram below. 
 
Diagram1: Key Processes for Joining Radical Groups 
                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Developed from Wiktorowicz (2004). 
 
People do not awake with a sudden will to join a radical group, instead they have been 
experiencing a socialization process and an exposure to the groups thoughts and ideas, and 
Cognitive Opening 
Religious 
Seeking/Identity Seeking 
Frame 
    Socialization 
Value 
Internalization 
JOINING 
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even experimentation with other groups, which eventually leads them to embrace one certain 
radical group (Wictorowicz 2004).   
     Diagram 1 shows processes that are involved in such a decision. The two first processes 
are essential for further commitment and socialization, that means that if an individual is not 
open-minded to new ideas, do not meet or rejects the movement’s message, he or she will 
miss the activities necessary to embrace the ideology and eventually join the group 
(Wiktorowicz 2004). 
     Cognitive Opening: The diagram starts with cognitive opening which implies that an 
individual becomes aware of new ideas and other ways to look at the world, as well as getting 
exposed to the movements’ message. A crisis can be central in the cognitive opening. This 
crisis can be of economic (losing a job), social/cultural (racism, humiliation) and political 
(repression, torture, political discrimination) character (Wiktorowicz 2004: 7-8). The political 
point can be connected to the Grievance factor in model 4. 
     Religious Seeking/Identity Seeking: A cognitive opening can lead to religious seeking 
where individuals can be searching for meanings in religion. Wiktorowicz (2004) argues here 
that the greater role religion has on one’s identity, the greater chance for the individuals to 
respond to the cognitive opening through religious seeking (Wiktorowicz 2004: 8). Religious 
seeking is a form for identity seeking. But identity seeking is not only of religious character. 
Individuals can be reevaluating their identity after personal events or crisis and they can 
establish a new identity by joining a radical group (Munton et al 2011).  
     Frame alignment: The seeker finds sense in the thoughts and practices of a radical group, 
and becomes interested in learning more about the group (Wiktorowicz 2004). 
      Socialization: When the frame alignment has taken place, deeper socialization can occur. 
At this point the newcomers to the group are willing to learn more about the group in general 
and the ideology. The individual goes through activities and lessons that facilitate identity-
construction and value change (Wiktorowicz 2004: 10). They also get to know other people in 
the group as the movements encourage social bonds that could create a new social networks 
(Ibid 2004), and the newcomers get socialized and may see that the group is not that extreme, 
as the media could have given the impression of, after all and they get pleasantly surprised 
(Fangen 2001).   
     In the end of the model is Value Internalization which implies that the individual has 
embraced the new thoughts and values, and then decides to Join the radical group. When the 
individuals has taken the final decision to join the group, they will get further sight into the 
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groups ideology, and this again will tie the members identity closer to the group, and they get 
further radicalized (Wiktorowicz 2004).  
     In this part we have seen that many different factors are at work in a radicalization process. 
The Identity seeking factor could be of special importance, and the ideological aspects could 
be seen as a way of identity seeking, especially ideologies that are of a religious character. 
     The next question then is, once a person has become radicalized, what can be done to 
make him/her turn away from radical movements (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009), leaving 
extremism, political violence and terrorism behind - what is deradicalization? Is it just 
radicalization in reverse? 
 
4.0 Deradicalization 
Since radicalization is a process where a person can approach extreme thoughts, 
deradicalization has come to mean somewhat the opposite. Deradicalization is the process 
where the extreme thoughts and practices slowly fade away and are replaced by a more 
“normal” sight of the society. It is also the process where one accepts that violence is not a 
good way to solve problems. This whole process of deradicalization is a slow one, and it is 
easier to be radicalized, than to deradicalize (Rabasa et al 2010: 1-2), it is also easier to get 
disengaged than deradicalized (Horgan 2009), there is however some problems connected to 
the measurement of success with deradicalization, this will be explored below. But first I look 
at what disengagement has come to mean today, and then discuss the differences between 
disengagement and deradicalization.  
 
4.1.1 Disengagement       
When leaving a radical group the main goal is for the individuals to get deradicalized, but 
several only gets to disengagement. Before I go into pathways that can lead to 
deradicalization I will describe what it means to be disengaged since many of the radicals end 
up in this “category” when they leave a radical group. The problem with being “only” 
disengaged is that disengagements may not result in any reduction in radical ideological 
support (Horgan 2009).  
     Horgan (2009) suggests in “Leaving terrorism behind” that there is a difference between 
psychological disengagement and physical disengagement. In psychological disengagement a 
person can feel that the ideas thought to represent the organization are not the same as he/she 
thought it to be, and he/she starts to feel unsecure about the ideology in the movement. There 
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can also be disagreements within the group that can lead to a growing insecurity about the 
movement. Disagreement on political and ideological issues within the group can also lead to 
psychological disengagement. Psychological disengagement can also happen if a person get 
kicked out of the movement, and if a person feel that it is time to change his/her life style and 
priorities. Psychological disengagement is more likely to happen early in the engagement in 
the movement, rather than later when the people are more indoctrinated into the movement 
(Horgan 2009: 20- 22).  
     In physical disengagement other factors are relevant for the disengagement. First you can 
simply leave the group by your own free will. You can also get kicked out of the movement. 
Disengagement can also refer to a change in the roles in the movement. Jail and death stands 
for the most dramatic ways of leaving a movement (Ibid 2009: 25). The factors from both the 
psychological and the physical disengagement are core components in the disengagement 
process, but there is an urgent need to collect more data on factors that make people disengage 
(Ibid 2009: 27-28).   
     One other factor that has proven to be effective in the process with disengagement, is if the 
people in the radical group or organization experience something that can be seen as a trigger 
for disengagement, like a violent incident within the ”gang” for example. This incident can 
function as a trigger to either disengage or to get more involved. It is important that an 
intervention takes place after the incident, so it makes it more likely that people will 
disengage, rather than getting more involved (Rabasa et al 2010: xiii-xiv).  
     In the disengagement process it is also important that to disengage is looked upon as 
something “attractive” and motivating. A strategy compromised of both hard and soft 
components has proven to be the best way to get people to start on the disengagement 
process. When people has been through a disengagement process it is also important that they 
are assisted in how to get back to the society and helped to get a job and a place to live. In 
addition the former extremist should stay away from his earlier group, organization or gang 
and make an effort to be part of what is viewed as the ”normal” society. Whether the 
disengagement process is successful or not, has very much to do with the person’s 
commitment to the group or organization. If a person has a high position it is harder to 
disengage. Level of commitment in the group has also very much to say. If a person has been 
a member of that specific group or organization for many years he/ she can feel that the life 
“outside” is unknown, and be afraid of leaving the well- known group and the friends within 
the group (Ibid 2010: xiv- xv).  
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     Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) discuss some similarities and differences in how people on their 
own initiative can leave different extremist groups and factors that in different groups can be 
an obstacle for leaving.  In youth gangs and groups age is an important factor. When people 
get older they want other things like family and a more stable life, these factors can make it 
easier to disengage. Violence can also make it easier to disengage from a youth group, 
especially if a person experiences violence close to himself or his friends (Bjørgo & Horgan 
2009: 7). 
     How long an individual has been a member of the group has also something to say for 
disengagement, long- time members have a harder time disengage than people who have only 
been members for a short period. In youth gangs stigmatization from the society can make it 
harder to disengage because they will meet people out in the society that are judgmental 
because of the ex-members past. Leaving a gang or a youth group can be similar to joining it; 
there are certain steps that you go through. But it is more complicated and harder to leave the 
group than to join it (Ibid 2009: 7-8). 
     According to Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) there can be great problems for people who want 
to disengage from religious groups or sects as many of these groups or sects are accused for 
brainwashing, as well as the members feel a great degree of stigmatization when they re-enter 
the society (Ibid 2009: 8-9) Rabasa et al (2010) also claims that disengagement from religious 
groups could be particularly difficult compared to other extremists groups (Rabasa et al 
2010). I have therefore constructed my sixth hypothesis (H6) in relation to their claim,  
 
H6: Deradicalization/disengagement could be especially difficult for those in groups with a 
religious ideology. 
 
     There is however many similarities in the disengagement from religious groups and racists 
groups. When disengaging from racist or Right-wing groups, people can also experience 
stigmatization from the society, and this can be a barrier to leaving. What is different in the 
disengagement in racist or Right-wing groups is that there is a great risk of getting punished 
by the groups when leaving. Other racist groups can also get involved in the punishment of 
the disengaged person. Religious groups do not practice violent punishment (Bjørgo & 
Horgan 2009: 9-10).  
     As mentioned disengagement is not the ultimate goal in assisting people to withdraw from 
their radical movements, deradicalization is what is aimed for. 
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4.1.2 Deradicalization and Disengagement- the Tricky Difference 
Deradicalization is the goal in deradicalization programs, but it is possible to be disengaged 
even though you are not deradicalized. A person can still have the same thoughts and ideas 
after being through a deradicalization program, but he/she can be less active in the former 
group. What is important is whether this person is likely to participate in violent actions and 
terrorist attacks (Horgan 2009: 27-28).  
     In Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists (2010) deradicalization is looked upon as the process 
where there is a huge change in persons´ beliefs. Were the old and radical mindset is changed 
with more nuanced ways of looking at the world (Rabasa et al 2009: 5).  
     Disengagement on the other hand has much to do with behavior and is seen as the process 
where a person changes his/hers behavior and turn away from violence and radical 
organizations where this kind of behavior is normal. But disengagement does not only refer to 
leaving a group, disengagement can also mean the changing of roles inside a terrorist 
organization, but it often implicates that the person that disengages do not execute any 
violence. Disengagement refers to the behavior part and deradicalization refers to the whole 
process of changing ones beliefs and thought in a fundamental way, deradicalization is in that 
case a much bigger step for the target persons as this process is more all-encompassing (Ibid 
2009: 6).  
     A successful deradicalization program should be a program where both disengagement and 
deradicalization are part of the process. The goal is to change both the mindset and the 
behavior. The problem here is that one often can see that the radicals` behavior can change, 
but the way of thinking and the beliefs are constant and unchangeable (Ibid 2009: 6-7). 
     It is very important to know whether a person is deradicalized or only disengaged. To find 
indications on this, observation and analysis of the individuals actions and words could be 
possible, but this is not a method that is hundred percent reliable, especially with Islamist 
extremists this has turned out to cause problems as the Islamist extremists often get tempted 
by the benefits that comes with being deradicalized, in first case their freedom and second, 
jobs and a place to live (this is especially the case with the well-developed programs that have 
a good after-care system). This can make the Islamist extremists, that have been through a 
deradicalization program, create an impression that they are deradicalized, when they really 
are just disengaged (Ibid 2009: 6-8). However, it is more important to do something about 
violent behavior than changing the whole mindset of individuals, meaning, disengagement is 
after all better than being a radical (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 3).  
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4.2 How to Measure Success? 
There are some problems with measuring success in deradicalization programs. First of all the 
programs are relatively new, and that makes it hard, if not impossible, to find the long-term 
results. Secondly, many programs have a huge lack of reliable data or statistics about the 
success of the programs since many governments are afraid of being criticized as a result of 
data-collection and publishing of the results (Rabasa et al 2010). 
     It is also hard to get in contact with so called reformed extremists. Sometime after 
finishing the programs the reformed extremists are “watched” by the programs, but after a 
period the focus on them stops and is put elsewhere, and it is hard to say what happens with 
the ex-extremists then, if they re-join a radical group or if they stay on the “right” side. 
Another problem in measuring success is the discussion I have mentioned before about 
disengagement and deradicalization. A person can be disengaged, but not deradicalized, and 
that is an obstacle for measuring success (Ibid 2010).  
     The measurement for success can also change from country to country and from program 
to program. In many programs success has been defined as disengagement, this implies, as we 
have seen, that ex-extremists do not commit violent attacks or re-join a radical movement. 
Even though there are no common measure for success, most programs use as a minimum 
definition for success that most participants in the programs gets and stays disengaged (Ibid 
2010: 41).  
     However, there is an ongoing debate about whether deradicalization should be the ultimate 
goal for the programs, and what really should be included in the term deradicalization, or if 
disengagement is enough, an expert on the issue said; 
 
 “You´ll find a lot of deradicalized jihadists, the ones who abandon political violence, 
they´re not really liberals, so they´ll still have misogynist views, xenophobic views, 
homophobic views, and so forth on and so forth” 
 
                                                                                          (Fink &El- Said 2010: 24).  
 
     Because of the lack of agreement among countries in measuring success, it is challenging 
to compare different programs as they lack a common platform. But recidivism is a measure 
that is used by many of the programs as a measurement for success (Ibid 2010: 24). But how 
low should the recidivism rate be to be called a success? The lack of agreement is evident also 
here (Ibid 2010). 
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     And, is it really a need for a common measurement for success when the countries that are 
using the programs are as different as Norway, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia? A solution can 
be that every country has their own indicators for success that can function as a platform for 
comparison among countries (Ibid 2010: 24). 
     What is agreed upon on the other hand is that when a person joins a radical movement, 
many ties are made, like friendship. For a deradicalization program to be successful these ties 
must be broken, so that the individuals do not rejoin the group to meet their friends when they 
are finished with the program. To be successful deradicalization programs should also 
challenge individual’s beliefs and destroy individual’s affective connection with the 
movement as well as creating new interests for the individuals (Rabasa et al 2010: 42-43). 
     As we have seen no common measurement for success with the programs exists today, but 
there is nevertheless many factors with success that are agreed upon. The question is whether 
there is a need for a common measurement or nor. Many of the countries that have 
deradicalization programs are so different that a common measurement can be challenging to 
create (Ibid 2010).  I have nevertheless chosen the criteria’s that are the most agreed upon in 
the literature and made a model with them. 
 
4.3 Model for Success 
It would have been convenient if there were a “best practice” model for how to run 
deradicalization programs. Unfortunately this is not the case, much because of the different 
social and political context extremism exists in. The programs are formed by the context in 
which they exist and as a consequence there are different measures for success (Bjørgo & 
Horgan 2009).  
     Even though deradicalization programs are context specific there are some factors that are 
often mentioned in the literature as minimum criteria for success. Based on these criteria’s I 
have made a model over factors that should be fulfilled when a person deradicalizes and for 
the program to be called successful. 
     Model 5 lists factors that should be fulfilled for a deradicalization program to constitute 
success. The factors are based on the literature found in Rabasa et al (2010) and Bjørgo & 
Horgan (2009). The factors are:  
 
1. Most of the programs see it as a success if the participants in the programs do not 
commit acts of violence or terror attacks, in their own country, after finishing the 
deradicalization program (Rabasa et al 2010: 41). This criteria is also found in Bjørgo 
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& Horgan (2009) to be one of the criteria’s for a deradicalization program to achieve 
success, and is important for disengagement for all groups (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 
250). 
 
2. For success to be achieved the ex-militants should also stay away from engaging in 
their old organization or other extremist organizations, this criteria is important in the 
disengagement for Islamist extremists (Rabasa et al 2010: 41), as well as in the 
disengagement for Right-wing extremists (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009). 
 
3. The last criterion is also important for the deradicalization for both groups, the non-
involvement with people that are still members of radical and extremist organizations 
(Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 250). 
 
Even though not all programs sees full deradicalization as necessary to constitute success, 
participants of different deradicalization programs should disengage as well as deradicalize, 
as deradicalizing refers to the changing in ones believes and values. When deradicalizing both 
the ex-militants ideology and in some cases also the organization in which the person was a 
member, is weakened (Rabasa et al 2010: 41-42).  
     The three criteria’s listed here should be fulfilled for the programs to call themselves 
successful, but it is also important that each program set clear goals for what they want to 
achieve (Bjørgo &Horgan 250-251).  
 
Model 5: Factors that Should be Fulfilled for a Successful Disengagement 
No execution of 
violence or violent 
attacks  
No re-joining of the 
radical organization  
Non-involvement with 
members of the radical 
organization  
          
            V 
 
            V 
 
            V 
 
 
Having clarified the difference between disengagement and deradicalization and having 
explicitly presented factors that should be involved for a program to be considered a success, I 
now move over to explain pathways which can lead to deradicalization. 
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4.4 Pathways to Deradicalization 
Most radical people withdraw from their group at some time or another, and many factors can 
be important in the decision to leave (Bjørgo 2009: 36). These factors can be conceptualized 
as functioning either as “push” or “pull” factors. (Morris, Eberhard, Rivera, Watsula 2010: 4). 
The push factors relate to disadvantages with staying in a radical group, such as negative 
social forces and circumstances (Bjørgo 2009: 36). The pull factors are factors that can attract 
a person to deradicalize from the group due to different “rewards” connected to exit, such as 
career possibilities and marriage (Ibid 2009: 36). The factors I have included in this section 
are; Negative social sanctions, Disillusionment and Acts of violence which are push factors, 
and Rewards which is a pull factor. In addition I have included Burnout in the model. 
 
4.4.1 Negative Social Sanctions 
Negative social sanctions are a factor that is found to be of special importance for exit from 
Right-wing extremism. Negative sanctions from people outside of the milieu can make some 
of the radicals reconsider their involvement in the extreme group. Such sanctions are more 
likely to affect the individuals if they are relatively new members (Bjørgo 2009: 36). From 
this I create my seventh hypotheses: 
 
H7: Negative social sanctions are of special importance for deradicalization for Right-wing 
extremists. 
      
4.4.2 Disillusionment 
 Disillusionment is a factor closely connected to the deradicalization process, and is very 
important for exit from Right-wing extremism as well as from Islamists extremist groups 
(Disley et al 2011). Disillusionment can arise when a person find that the ideas he/she thought 
to represent the group and involvement in it, are not the ones they thought it to be, that the 
individual feel some sort of disappointment with the group.  
     Those who became members of the group especially for ideological and political 
motivations may experience disillusionment when they see that the group does not work that 
“hard” for the population they claim to fight for after all. For example if an individual joined 
to fight for the Muslims it can be troubling that, according to some estimates, around eight 
times more Muslims than Westerns are killed in Al Qu´ida attacks (Bjørgo 2011: 5). From 
this factor I have constructed my 8th hypothesis,  
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H8: Disillusionment is one of the most important factors for deradicalization for both Right-
wing extremists and Islamist extremists. 
      
4.4.3 Acts of violence 
Acts of violence or a dramatic event often starts the process that can lead to exit and 
deradicalization from groups. This event can function as a trigger for the exit processes in a 
way that it is a realization that the group is something the individual don’t want to be a part of 
(Rabasa et al 2010). Acts of violence can also be required of the individuals as a criterion for 
further involvement, and this can make people start considering the process with leaving 
(Morris et al 2010: 4). 
 
 4.4.4 Rewards 
Rewards are connected to different benefits with leaving the radical groups; this could be 
factors that are connected to future career prospect which is of special importance for the 
Right-wing extremists (Bjørgo 2009). The individuals can realize that if they are to get a 
career later in life it is important to deradicalize from the radical milieu and take an education 
before it is to late (Ibid 2009). Positive social ties can also be included under rewards and is 
relevant for both Right-wing extremists and Islamists (Disley, Weed, Reding, Clutterbuc & 
Warnes 2011). Marriage and having children are seen as changed social ties and can in a large 
degree function as a trigger for exit (Horgan 2009). The “longing for freedom of a `normal` 
life” (Bjørgo 2009: 39) can be significant here. The individuals start to get tired of the life in 
the radical group with constant paranoia and insecurity as to whom to trust within the group; 
they can start to wish for a “normal” life and someone to share it with (Bjørgo 2009). From 
the reward factor I create my ninth and last hypothesis: 
 
H9: Rewards is important for deradicalization for both Right-wing extremist and Islamist 
extremists. 
 
     4.4.5 Burnout 
Burnout is also a factor that could have relevance for deradicalization, but is more important 
for the Right-wing extremists than for the Islamists, and is therefore not included in the model 
above. Burnout refers to situations where members in the groups are freezed-out by the other 
members and are no longer wanted as members in that particular organization. Burnout can in 
that way function as a trigger for exit (Disley, Weed, Reding, Clutterbuc & Warnes 2011).      
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Model 5: Factors that can Lead to Deradicalization from Right-Wing and Islamist Extremist 
Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
                                                                       Deradicalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are many factors that could be active in the process of deradicalization, but due to a 
lack of data material in the area it is hard to say which factors are the most important (Vank & 
Wagenaar 2010). I have tried to mention the ones that are the most frequently mentioned in 
the literature on disengagement and deradicalization, this implies that there are alternative 
factors that are not listed here, but could also be found to have relevance. 
     As the theoretical part of this thesis is now presented I will summarize the hypotheses that 
are established before I move to the Methodological section of this thesis. The hypotheses: 
 
 H1: Individuals that get recruited to extremist movements lack a clear identity. 
H2: Ideology can be a good source to identity.   
H3: Experiences of grievance can make it easier to get radicalized. 
H4: People that have experiences with personal victimization can easier get radicalized. 
H5: Prolonged membership in a radical group makes the individuals more radical. 
H6: Deradicalization/disengagement could be especially difficult for those in groups with a 
religious ideology. 
H7: Negative social sanctions are of special importance for deradicalization for Right-wing 
extremists. 
Dissilusionment 
Acts of Violence 
Rewards 
Negative Social 
Sanctions 
Burnout 
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H8: Disillusionment is one of the most important factors for deradicalization for both Right-
wing extremists and Islamist extremists. 
H9: Rewards is important for deradicalization for both Right-wing extremist and Islamist 
extremists. 
      
5.0 Methods and Data 
5.1 Qualitative versus Quantitative Research Design 
Method is a way to collect information about the reality (Jacobsen 2000). This collection of 
information is either qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative research method is based on 
numerical data which enables description of the reality based on numbers and tables. 
Qualitative research gives information in the form of textual descriptions that often are 
collected through interviews (Ringdal 2007: 22). 
     There are benefits and disadvantages with both the two ways to collect data. In qualitative 
research you have emphasis on understanding rather than explanation, being close to the 
individuals that are included in the research is also important and the material that is collected 
is often collected after deep interviews, something that enables better understanding (Tjora 
2010). A disadvantage with qualitative research is that there is no room for as many 
informants as in quantitative research. Quantitative research can include larger selections of 
the population something that enables better casual explanations (Ringdal 2007). 
     In the beginning of this project the intention was to find data material from different efforts 
and programs that said something about success with the programs or the repetition rate of the 
participants. Unfortunately it became clear that very few countries have collected data in the 
aftermath of different deradicalization programs, and therefore it is hard to say something 
about how successful the programs have been. The programs are also relatively new in most 
countries, something that also makes it harder to measure success and long-term effects. 
Reformed extremists are also hard to track down in order to measure how well they have 
“ended up”. (Rabasa et al 2010: 40-41). 
     As a consequence of the lack of data I decided to use qualitative method in this thesis, and 
to interview people from different radical groups that had been through some sort of 
deradicalization effort or had other insights into the field
12
. 
     
                                                 
12
 The thought was to interview Right-wing extremists from Norway and Sweden and Islamists extremists from 
the UK and Denmark. As it turned out to be very difficult to find people in both Sweden and Denmark, I decided 
that I needed to limit it down to Right-wing extremists from Norway, and some from Sweden, and Islamist 
Extremists from the UK.   
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5.2 Interviews as Data Collection 
How data is collected can have impact on the results in a survey (Jacobsen 2000: 131). The 
research interview is the most common form for data collection in qualitative research. This 
form of data collection is useful if one is interested in opinions, attitudes and experiences. 
When doing research interviews there is an interest for how the informants have acquired 
different opinions and their understanding of reality on the background of experiences they 
have had in their life (Tjora 2009: 56-57). 
     When doing such interviews one seeks to understand issues from the subjects` point of 
view, to go deeper into their experiences and understand their lived world prior to scientific 
explanations (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 1). The research interview is a professional 
conversation and is based around aspects of the daily life. However, the interview 
conversation is not one between equal partners; the researcher has the control over the 
situation (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 2-3). 
     There are different forms of interviews. Personal interviews, face to face or over telephone, 
and group interviews are the most common forms. In individual interviews the researcher can 
get detailed information about the informants and the data that are collected are sentences and 
stories (Jacobsen 129-130).  
     The best thing is to meet the person that is interviewed face to face because it is easier to 
get real information in that way. Body language has much to say, as well as the researcher to a 
bigger extent can give response to the informant, and it is easier to speak about sensitive 
issues face to face. Personal interviews are however often expensive and takes time. 
Telephone interviews can reduce these costs. But there are some disadvantages with 
telephone interviews. The informants can easier tell things that are not totally true in 
telephone interviews and if many of the questions are “open” it can be more difficult to start a 
good conversation over telephone. The chance to observe the informant is also lost when 
doing telephone interviews and this form of interview can take a very anonymous character. 
However, the benefits with low costs and no travel expenses is a very positive side to this 
form of interview (Jacobsen 2000).  
     In the collection of data to this thesis I have used a combination of telephone interviews 
and personal interviews. Due to informants that were spread all over Norway, and Sweden, I 
have interviewed most of the Right-wing extremists over telephone. One of the interviews 
was personal and one interview was done over Skype. Even though this method is not 
optimal, I had long telephone interviews, most of them 45-80 minutes and I felt I got the 
information that was needed for this survey, mostly why they became involved in the groups, 
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why they withdraw from the group, combined with their thoughts around the ideological 
aspects
13
. 
     In England I had two personal interviews that both lasted over one hour. I also had one 
interview over Skype. In the interviews from both sides, I tried to look for how committed the 
people were in their organizations, why they decided to deradicalize/disengage, how big a part 
the different deradicalization efforts played in the disengagement process and how central the 
different ideologies were to them. These questions are not of very “open” character and it is 
therefore easier to ask them over telephone than if the questions had been more open 
(Jacobsen 2000).     
 
5.2.1 Right-Wing Extremists 
Finding the informants for the interviews was not done over-night. I contacted several 
organizations and a lot of people that have been working in this area. Since the plan in the 
beginning was to have more informants from Sweden I have contacted several instances there 
as well. 
     In Norway I first tried to contact Adults for Children, VFB (Voksne For Barn), as they 
were the ones hosting the Exit project in Norway from 1997 (Bjørgo, Donselaar and 
Grunenberg 2009: 136), but they could not provide information about previous participants in 
the programs. I also contacted the people that worked with the EXIT project, including Tore 
Bjørgo and Yngve Carlsson. In addition I contacted the Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services (NSD), The Norwegian Police University College, The Norwegian Police Security 
Service (PST), different local police stations, different researchers at universities, the 
Norwegian Correctional Services (Kriminalomsorgen) and different Right-wing organizations 
directly to hear is they could provide some assistance. The different local police stations 
helped me in the way that they contacted relevant people for the interviews and asked if they 
were interested in participating, if the people contacted were interested their contact 
information were given to me. 
     In Sweden I contacted “Fryshuset” since they are the ones hosting EXIT Sweden. I also 
contacted The Swedish Security Service (Säpo), Hall-prison as well as different Right-wing 
organizations.  Out of the contact that was made I was able to find nine people that were 
willing to get interviewed; however, they do not constitute a representative sample of the 
population. 
                                                 
13
 See Appendix for interview guide. 
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     The radical organizations that are represented on the Right-wing extremists side is; 
“Vigirid”, “Viking”, “Svenska Motståndsrörelsen”, “Eskiltuna NS”, “Hvit Arisk Motstand” 
(White Aryan Resistance) and “Boot Boys”.  
     When finding informants it had to be a criterion that the Right-wing extremists had been 
through some kind of deradicalization efforts. In Norway these effort has mainly been 
conversations with the police, “preventive conversations”, and support for those who wanted 
to disengage, especially through the Exit-project (Bjørgo, Donselaar & Grunenberg 2009: 
136). Of the nine people that I have interviewed there were some variations in how much 
support they were given in regard to deradicalization. This could have an impact on the 
answers they gave me. 
     Due to problems finding informants, I have interviewed seven people from Norway and 
two people from Sweden. The two people that are interviewed from Sweden have also gone 
through preventive conversations or/and involvement in EXIT in Sweden. There was no 
criterion that the informants had to be fully deradicalized, because it is interesting to see the 
reason why someone stayed in the radical groups even after they had been through 
deradicalization efforts. Of the nine people I have interviewed, seven of them are today totally 
deradicalized (withdrawn from the groups as well as changed views) from their previous 
milieus, and they do not want to be symbolized with their earlier activism. The two others are 
still active in their milieu, even after efforts from the Norwegian Police Security Service, 
PST, to make them deradicalize/disengage, preventive conversations. Of the people I have 
interviewed seven were men and two were women, eight of them were in the age 25-40, one 
was over fifty. 
     The informants had different degrees of commitment and involvement in their (former) 
groups, not all of them were members for such a long period of time that they became fully 
radicalized as extremists (that means accepting the use of violence (PST 2012)). 
      
5.2.2 Islamist Extremists 
For this thesis to be as balanced as possible the best thing would have been to have the exact 
same source of information with regard to the interviews and the collection of data-material in 
Norway and the UK. The plan was to interview former Islamist extremist in the UK and 
Denmark that had been through some sort of deradicalization. This group turned however out 
to be hard to find and the sensitive character of it did not make it any easier. 
     As in Norway and Sweden I contacted a lot of organizations to try to establish the contact. 
Some of the ones that I contacted were: Quilliam Foundation, Active Change Foundation, Ed 
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Husain, European Muslim Research Center, Demos, Street, Wormwood Scrubs prison, Home 
Office, Bringing Communities Together, Faith Matters and different professors at Universities 
in England. My request for finding people was also posted on the webpage to the new 
network “Against Violent Activism”, AVE; which is a network where reformed terrorists and 
ex-violent radicals can get in touch with each other. In addition I also contacted several 
instances in Denmark. Some of the ones I contacted in Demark were; Danish Security and 
Intelligence Service (PET), The Danish Ministery of Jusice and “VINK” Denmark. 
     Despite a hard effort to find people in the UK and Denmark that were willing to get 
interviewed and at the same time met my requirements, I ended up with only three people 
from the UK
14
. This was Hanif Qadir, Rashad Ali and Pat Parry. Unlike the Right-wing 
extremists these people are not anonymous as all three of them agreed to be named in the 
thesis. 
     Hanif Qadir is a former member of Al- Qu`ida and founder of Active Change Foundation, 
ACF. ACF is based in London and works to counter extremism, help those involved in street 
and gang crimes out of the milieus, help with chaos management, faith and racial issues. ACF 
works close to young and vulnerable people, in that way they can easier spot signs of 
radicalization (ACF 2012). 
     Rashad Ali is a former member of Hizb ut- Tahrir
15
, and later one of the founders of 
Quilliam Foundation, he now works at CENTRI. CENTRI stands for Counter Extremism 
Consultancy, Training, Research and Interventions and they work to deliver evidence- based 
counter-extremism solutions. They are specialized in Islam and they provide information to 
national, regional and local governments, the police, universities, the media and different 
religious institutions. In addition they offer training to those who are to work with counter-
extremism (CENTRI 2012). 
     Pat Parry do not have a radical background but have been active in the work with 
deradicalization of both Islamist extremists and Right-wing extremists in an organization 
called EMCCU. EMCCU is a multi-agency organization working to help people that may be 
vulnerable to violent extremism. They focus on understanding peoples´ needs before they 
look at solutions to their problems (EMCCU 2012). 
     Both Hanif Qadir and Rashad Ali have been active in radical groups; they had however not 
gone through any deradicalization program. This is a potentially problem because it makes the 
                                                 
14
 I did not find anyone willing to get interviewed in Denmark. 
15
 Hizb ut-Tahrir is a radical Islamist political party with connections worldwide. They strive to establish a 
worldwide Islamic caliphate and are against democracy. They are also known for the promotion of hate and 
encouraging of terrorism (Akershaug & Talseth 2010). 
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two groups different, but because of problems getting it in another way, it had to be done like 
that. They withdraw from the groups without any assistance, but due to their previous 
involvement in radical groups and because they are both working with deradicalization today, 
I decided to interview them because of their great experience in the field. From the interviews 
with them I am relying on both their statements in regard to their personal experiences, as 
well as their experience in the work with deradicalization of radical people. 
     The interviews with Hanif Qadir and Rashad Ali were personal and were carried out in 
London, they lasted around one and a half hour each. The interview with Pat Parry was done 
over Skype. Both Hanif Qadir, Rashad Ali and Pat Parry works with deradicalizaton today 
and have great insight into this field. When doing the interview with Hanif Qadir I was also 
showed around at the Active Change Foudations center in Waltham Forest in London. 
     In addition I include some secondary data material in the analysis. The data I got access to 
is collected by CENTRI
16
 during the last two and a half years and was handed to me from 
Rashad Ali. The data is a written document, secondary data material, formed after 
conversations with people that were in the process of disengaging from their radical groups. 
The people in the data are mostly men and a couple of women in the age 16-28. The material 
is based on conversations with the people that were held in the periods where they were 
disengaging from extremist milieus. The focus was to help them to deradicalize so the data-
material focus on intellectual, emotional and behavioral changes that took place. Because of 
this, I can find relevant information in this data that is also answering some of my most 
relevant questions
17
. 
     The extremist organizations that are represented from the Islamist extremist side is: Al 
Qu´ida, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-muhajiroun. 
     Since I am also relaying on secondary data material in this thesis, I will explain the use of 
this method in the following section. 
    In qualitative analysis the best thing is that the scientist collects the data material 
himself/herself. But in some cases this is not possible and there is a need to use secondary 
data to go through with the analysis. It is however important to be aware that not all 
qualitative data are enabled to be reused and that some shades will be lost (Tjora 2010: 152-
153). 
                                                 
16
 Counter Extremism Consultancy, Training, Research and Interventions, 
http://www.centri.org.uk/CENTRI/Home.html 
17
 The use of secondary data material is not an optimal method as the data from the two groups compared should 
be as similar as possible, but this was the only possible way to carry out a comparison in this thesis. 
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     There are many problems with secondary data. First of all the data that is collected could 
have been meant to suit another purpose, a different problem (Jacobsen 2000: 124-125). The 
data may therefore not suit the new project, and this makes it harder for the scientist to get all 
he/she wants out of the data-material (Jacobsen 2000: 124-125). 
     Second, some of the control over the data-material is also lost when using secondary data 
material. Information about how the data was collected can be missing, as well as a lack of 
information in regard to who collected it; if it is possible one should clarify who collected the 
data, how it was done, when the data is from and how the data material was registered. This 
makes it easier to say something about how reliable the data material is (Jacobsen 2000: 152-
153). 
     In many cases secondary data is the only available data. Secondary data can include many 
sorts of material, from diaries to newspapers and data collected during interviews (Ringdal 
2007: 97-98). If one is aware of the lacks that can occur when using secondary data it is 
possible to use data collected by others several times (Tjora 2010: 152-153).  
      
5.3 Quality in Social Science  
In social science three criteria’s is often used as indications of quality. These are 
generalizability, validity and reliability. Tjora (2010) also mentions two additional criteria’s 
for quality; these are transparency and reflexivity (Tjora 2010: 175). In this section I go 
further into these five terms, and explain why they are important to be aware of when doing 
qualitative studies. I also describe the importance of being aware of ethical aspects when 
doing qualitative research. 
 
Generalizability (Extern Validity) 
Generalizability is to put the theoretical understanding that is achieved in a project into 
another context, in that way a survey can establish a more general understanding of the issues 
(Thagaard 1998: 184). When generalizing in a study there is a need to have a representative 
selection of the population, this means that there have to be a certain amount of people that 
participates in the study and that they are chosen in a specific way (Jacobsen 2000: 65). The 
selection of people in a qualitative study can often be skewed because they do not stand for a 
representative selection of the population
18
 (Jacobsen 2000: 214).  
                                                 
18
 Population means all the investigation units that are relevant to say something about. This unit will always be 
limited (Jacobsen 2000: 64). 
 52 
     Generalizability is not the ultimate goal in all surveys, some surveys wish to give an 
understanding in that specific context that the survey is done in (Thagaard 1998: 184). This is 
the case for this thesis, as the groups that are studied makes it almost impossible to have a 
representative selection as the people are hard to reach, and since the confidentiality around 
people that have been in contact with the police, because they wanted to disengage from 
radical milieus, is high. The support for Right-wing extremists milieus have also always gone 
in waves during the last thirty years and even in their “heydays” the members in Norway were 
just above 300 people (Lunde 2012). The unstable memberships also make it harder to get a 
representative selection. 
     The informants used in this thesis do not stand for a representative selection of the 
population, or the groups that they represent; Right-wings or Islamist- extremists. The 
findings can therefore not be generalized, something that deserves criticism, the findings can 
however function as an indication as to whether deradicalization is harder for specific groups 
and also point out some differences in regard to ideology between the two groups. In addition 
as Jacobsen (2004) claims; the findings can enable better understanding of the phenomena 
found in the survey (Jacobsen 2000: 214).  
 
Validity 
Validity is about the evaluation of the answers we find in science and if these really answer 
the questions asked. Validity can be strengthened by explaining the different choices that 
were made in a survey (Tjora 2010: 179). 
     When doing interviews one may however not always get the truth about the given issue, 
but the different statements may nevertheless express a person’s experiences and views 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 252), and this is the case for this thesis. Since the two 
investigation units in this analysis has been collected differently it can make it harder to 
compare them as the comparison basis gets different, this can be problematic and can also 
affect the validity of the research.  
     To verify the interpretation made would have been desirable to increase the validity, 
instead the answers given can only be seen as indications and cannot be taken as a verification 
of the interpretations, something that deserves criticism. Because most of my informants also 
are anonymous it makes it harder for others to test the verifiability, something that also affects 
the validity in this thesis. 
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     However, this thesis is carried out within the frames of social science and previous 
research is used both in matters of theory, and also in the formation of the approach to the 
problem, this is also an important source to high validity (Tjora 2010: 179).  
 
Reliability 
 Reliability is about how much we can rely on the data that appears in a survey (Jacobsen 
2000). No research is done in vacuum. The scientist will always have some sort of 
engagement in the project and it is important to find out what kind of position the scientist has 
in relation to the research. To strengthen the projects reliability it is important to reflect over 
whether one has anything in common with the informants or if one has special knowledge 
about the issue, and if this could affect the result in the analysis. To use quotes in the analysis 
can be a way to give the informants his/hers own voice in the analysis without any 
reformulation by the scientist, in that way the reliability to the survey can be strengthened 
(Tjora 2010). I have therefore used several quotes in the analysis part of this thesis. 
     To strengthen the reliability it is also important to inform about the context the survey is 
done in, and to explain if the results would have been the same if they were done by another 
scientist in another context (Tjora 2010: 175-178). 
 
Transparency 
When presenting a research material it is important to explain how the survey is done, what 
kind of choices that were made, different problems that occurred along the way and what kind 
of theories that were used, and how these worked (Tjora 2010: 188). This is important so that 
the reader of the survey understands how one gets to the interpretations (Mason 2002: 192). It 
is important that the reader gets a good insight into the research so that it is possible to decide 
the research credibility. To make a research transparent is to register choices and changes 
while doing the research (Tjora 2010: 188).  In this thesis I have presented how I have been 
working along the way, how data was collected, different problems that occurred and also 
why different choices were made, this should therefore meet the criteria for transparency. 
 
Reflexivity 
In qualitative research many things can affect the data that is collected. In an interview 
situation people can for example behave different since they know that they are the ones 
“investigated” (Jacobsen 2000: 221). We must also be aware that the interpretation of the data 
is formed by our own political, cultural, theoretical and cognitive opportunities and 
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surroundings. It is important to be aware of this so that the credibility to the survey increases. 
Reflection around the collected data is also important, so that the reader of the survey know 
how different interpretations were made (Tjora 2010: 88-189).  
         
Ethical aspects 
When doing quantitative analysis with few investigation units, it can be easier to recognize 
people that have participated in the survey, especially if many details were shared by the 
informants. This is something the researcher must be aware of when doing the analysis 
(Jacobsen 2000: 396). 
     The ethical aspects around interviews are bound up to how the data material is presented in 
the analysis. This is especially important if the informants can take any harm of the 
information that he/she has shared, especially when the shared information is of very personal 
character (Tjora 2010: 141). It is common today that informants are anonymous, this can 
however be problematic when it comes to the materials reliability as it is not possible to make 
a quality check of the presented material. However, anonymity for the informants is of special 
importance if the informants used to be bound up to any criminal milieus and if the milieus 
are small and easily recognizable. The informants should not under any circumstances take 
harm by getting involved in the study (Thagaard 2003: 24-27). If the information that is 
collected is of very sensitive character it is important to secure the privacy to the individuals 
that is investigated (Jacobsen 2000: 395). 
     Because of the complex character of the Right-wing milieus and because most of my 
informants do not want to be symbolized with their previous gangs or milieus all of my 
informants from the Right-wing milieu are anonymous
19
. This makes it hard for other 
researchers to test the verifiability in the survey, but is in some cases necessary (Jacobsen 
2000). The three informants from the Islamist extremist side are however presented with 
names as they agreed upon that. 
     Details that can be connected to the informants, as their gender combined with age, which 
organization they were members of and geographical area, where they were active, is not 
relevant for this thesis and is therefore not included together. I mention the different 
organizations that are represented, but this information is not combined with any other details 
that can reduce my informant’s anonymity.  
                                                 
19
 Anonymity means that it is impossible to connect information to the people’s identity (Jacobsen 2000: 396). 
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     All of the participants are aware that the participation was voluntary and are also aware of 
the risks and gains that such participation can lead to, informed consents
20
 (Jacobsen 2000: 
393). The survey is reported to the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). 
 
6.0 Analysis 
In this section the answers that were given to me during the interviews and the answers that 
come from the material I got from CENTRI are presented. The answers are presented under 
different sections so that it will be easier to spot the differences. The sections are divided after 
which order the questions had in the interviews and ways in and ways out are divided after the 
radicalization and deradicalization factors from the theory. The radicalization and 
deradicalization factors will also be mentioned in other parts, if they have relevance. To 
document general findings I have used quotes from the interviews. The interviews with the 
Right-wing extremists were done in Norwegian, so the quotes are translated from Norwegian 
to English
21
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
6.1 Ways In: Right-Wing Extremists 
It is not so that all people that are drawn to Right-wing extremist milieus have a bad 
childhood or background, but common for many of them is that they do not have a wish to 
take higher education or make a working career (Fangen 2001: 133). In this section I look at 
reasons for engaging in the milieus for Right-wing extremists found in the interviews. 
     In the interviews it became clear that many factors were active in the process of getting 
involved in a radical group, but some factors recur. 
 
 The Relevance of the Ideology 
All of my informants from the Right-wing side, apart from two, said that ideology had little to 
do with the involvement in the radical groups. Several said that ideology had nothing to do 
with the engagement at all, that they could have become members of anything at the moment. 
With the involvement in the radical groups there often raises a stigmatization from the media 
and the local society calling the people in the radical groups Right-wing extremists; 
 
 “After some time you have heard so many times that you are a Right-wing that before 
you know it, you are one”.   
                                                 
20
 See appendix for the information paper that was given to the informants. 
21
 See appendix for quotes in Norwegian. 
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This can lead to acceptance of an ideology that the individuals are not really that familiar 
with. 
     Even though few mentioned ideology as a driving force for engagement, many of them had 
a fascination to radical milieus and a radical mindset. One informant said that the ideology 
was less important, but that he had a fascination for Norse Mythology and Tor and Odin.  
     Negative views against immigrants were also common for many of the informants. 
Especially in the starting phase this was one of the driving forces; 
 
“There was a reception center close to where I lived, there were a lot of riots there 
and I wanted people to join the team against the “niggers”.  
 
This can be seen as an example of conflict with an out-group, the threat from outside 
strengthens the unity in the group. 
     With the involvement in the different radical groups, ideological perspectives also started 
growing, and most of the informants claimed that the ideological perspectives were something 
that came after they had been members for a while. One said: 
 
 “It is more about feelings than about ideology when you become Right-wing 
extremists. The Right-wing milieu becomes an emotional valve; you have different 
negative feeling in your body and these needs to get out one way or another”. 
 
 Some told that they after some time in the group started to read the literature connected to 
Right-wing extremism to get a better clue, as well as people that knew the literature got more 
respect in the groups. 
     Some of the informants thought when they became members that they had a clear picture 
of the ideology, but they saw in the aftermath that this was just something they said to 
convince themselves that there were no other reasons for joining. One of my informants said;  
 
“The truth is… that ideology had little to say, I think I could have joined anything. At 
that time I thought it was the ideology that was the driving force. Honestly, I think I 
could have become a Satanist or started hanging with people doing drugs, or getting 
into a religious cult, if I at that time had met a charismatic person who saw me and 
showed me that I was welcome”. 
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Some also told that they did not give the ideology much though in the beginning, that it was 
much more a way to seek excitement, and that they eventually started adopting the group’s 
views, and agree with the group on everything, radicalization in joining a group. One woman 
said that she repeated everything her boyfriend said and that he brainwashed her to believe in 
the ideology; 
 
 “I just repeated things that he said, that he had printed in my head, it was not me who 
talked it was him”.  
 
After some time several of the informants developed a relatively strong ideology, especially 
those who were in the most hardcore milieus and were much involved in violent activities. 
These are good example of that joining a radical group can increase radicalization, friends in 
the group and common goals can make them more radical than they were in the beginning. 
     Just two of the informants said that ideology was important for becoming a member, the 
two that are still active in the milieus, one of them said;  
 
“I could never have gone into an organization that did not share my national 
socialistic views, I believed in the ideology and that is also the reason for why I 
became a member”.  
    
Identity Seeking  
 A majority of the informants told about problems with aggression and the need to just feel 
that they belonged somewhere; this can be connected to the identity seeking factor in the way 
that they wanted to belong and that they joined a radical movement to established a new 
identity. Several of my informants also mentioned a lack of affiliation as one of the reasons 
for engaging in the milieus. One of them said;  
 
“An unstable home had much to say, I had much aggression in me, extremely negative 
thoughts about myself, I couldn’t fit in, I was frozen out and bullied at school, I 
walked around alone, wishing that I had friends”. 
 
Several told about this need to be seen and to get attention; 
 
“If you throw swastika in people’s faces you are seen and you get a lot of attention”.  
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Others also told about the need to just belong to a place; 
 
“I needed a place to be and rather than going to buy a gun, I found it beneficial to 
take contact with someone that had a clue…”  
 
The Right-wing radical movements became in that way a place where they could “get” a new 
identity and a place where they felt that they belonged.  
 
Political Grievance 
Political grievance was mentioned by several of my informants, some said that they had had 
negative experiences with immigrants and that this made them more skeptical against 
immigration, and that they wanted to do “something” to prevent that the “traditional” society 
got ruined”. One said;  
 
“When the power-elite in the country wants to extinguish Norwegians as an ethnic 
group, we have to create a balance so that we can get back Norway”. 
 
 Some informants also told that they saw that immigrants could have nice cars and nice 
clothes, and they got angry as a consequence, relative deprivation. 
     Even though political grievance was mentioned by several, this was not the most relevant 
factor found in the interviews with the Right-wing extremists. 
 
Personal Victimization 
A majority of my informants describes troublesome relations at home as one of the reasons 
why they became involved in extreme milieus, that they had bad personal experiences, 
personal victimization. Violence and alcohol problems were central. Problems adapting to 
school were also a factor that some of my informants mentioned as central for getting into a 
radical milieu, as well as lack of confidence and few friends. Some of them also experienced 
being bullied at school.  
 
Radicalization in Joining a Group                                                                                         
Some also told that they were driven by curiousness and the excitement of being involved in 
such a gang; 
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 “I searched excitement and affiliation”. 
 
Others came into the milieu because of friends or because they had a boyfriend or girlfriend 
that were already a member. One of my informants told that she became a member because 
her boyfriend wanted her to join the same milieu as him. This can also be connected to 
radicalization in joining radical group as recruitment to such groups often happens through 
family, friends or boyfriends/girlfriends. 
     One of the informants said that a further radicalization can happen after some time spent in 
the milieu;  
 
“It happens a radicalization, things that you thought were unthinkable when you first 
got committed to the group eventually become more normalized, to begin with there 
were some barriers”. 
 
Several people told that the more they got exposed to violence the more common it became 
and that they at some point started to care less and feel less sorry for the victims of the 
violence, one said; 
 
“We were going to a concert and saw an African man, one of the guys just hit him 
brutally down, and we walked away, the only thing we thought was; cool, when I think 
about it now it is horrible, but at that time there were no thoughts of regret or 
discomfort”. 
 
Rewards, Monetary and Status 
The status aspect was relevant in the process of radicalization for some of the 
informants. Especially if they had been bullied or had few friends at school they longed 
to get higher status. One of them said this about joining the radical group; 
 
“What I think they offered me was a feeling of being superior. That was a feeling that 
I really needed”. 
 
Many of the factors that were found in the radicalization process with Right-wing extremists 
were also relevant for the radicalization of Islamist extremists. 
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      6.2 Ways In: Islamist Extremists  
Many factors were also active in the process with radicalization for the Islamist extremists, 
and some of the factors had different relevance for the Islamist than for the Right-wing 
extremists.  
 
The Relevance of the Ideology 
From the material from CENTRI it turned out that the ideology and the religious dimension 
played a big part for why people became members. For some the political part was important, 
this could often be anger especially over the West, and the religious dimension fitted this 
framework. 
     Hanif Qadir on the other hand said that when he became a member the ideology did not 
cross his mind at all. He was angrier over the situation in Afghanistan and the loss of innocent 
lives there, than anything else, he said; 
 
 “It did not cross my mind [the ideology], I got involved, and the anger started 
growing when I saw American soldiers standing on top of dead women and children, I 
agreed that the war of terrorism was wrong, but what happened there was a war 
against Muslims”.  
 
Rashad Ali on the other hand said that for him the ideology was fundamental when deciding 
to join the movement, and that the ideology was primarily religious. 
 
Identity Seeking 
Rashad Ali said that Hizb-ut Tahrir were recruiting at schools, and that they contacted him. 
He said;  
 
“Identity, politics and religion compromises a package [in the movements]. The 
ideology defines who you are and I agreed upon the whole package”. 
 
The ideological aspect can be drawn to the identity seeking factor. Rashad Ali said that all the 
three components had equally much to say for him when getting radicalized.       
     From the interviews it became evident that people that get radicalized into Islamist 
extremism, if immigrants, can be struggling with their identity. They can see themselves as 
both citizens of a European country as well as their identity is connected to the country where 
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they were born, or where their parents were born. This can lead to an identity seeking that in 
the “worst” case can lead into radicalization. 
 
Political Grievance 
Most of the Islamist extremists (from the CENTRI material) came in contact with the 
organizations because these were active in their community. The different organizations often 
distributed material outside the Mosques after prayers. Some of these people were relatively 
new to Islam and some were converts, they were guided by the different organizations and 
”helped” to embrace the ideology as the religion of Islam. Many of these people could have a 
feeling of frustration when it came to the West and its role in the world, this can be seen as 
political grievance and Hanif Qadir meant that in the cases that he is working with today this 
is a big motivating factor for radicalization. The young people could see how American 
soldiers, for example, are (were) threating people in their original home countries, this can 
lead to frustration and anger over the situation and a will to revenge. 
 
Personal Victimization 
Pat Parry said that in the cases he has been working with, many of the people that gets 
radicalized comes from dysfunctional families and that this is one of the greatest reasons for 
radicalization. When they get radicalized they are also relatively young, the most common age 
group is from 13- 20, which implies that they are easier to affect. 
     Hanif Qadir also told about a case he had been working with where a boy in England 
experienced that people were always pulling his mother’s hijab and calling her a “terrorist”, 
this eventually lead him to become radicalized, this case is a good example of personal 
victimization, the boy experienced that people close to him were threated bad and he 
eventually felt the urge to revenge as a consequence. 
 
Radicalization in Joining a Group 
Hanif Qadir, in his own experience, told that people came to him to recruit him to Al Qu´ida. 
Initially people came to see him about helping orphans in Afghanistan. He agreed to support 
them as he thought the humanitarian situation was bad there. He said; 
 
 “I was angry at the soldiers that killed the children”.  
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He decided to go to Afghanistan to help, and when he came to Afghanistan he saw that the 
group, Al- Qu`ida, was much tougher and used harder methods than he though when he 
became a member, however he also got more angry when he came to Afghanistan and saw the 
situation with his own eyes, and anger can lead to further radicalization, radicalization in 
joining a group.  
 
Rewards, Monetary and Status 
From the data material collected from the Islamist extremists, rewards, monetary and status 
was not mentioned by anyone as a factor that had relevance for their radicalization. These 
factors could however have relevance for this group, and is frequently mentioned in the 
literature.  
 
6.3 Degree of Commitment: Right-Wing Extremists 
The informants had very different degrees of commitment to the groups they were members 
of. Four of them had leader positions in the groups, one hardly knew who the other members 
were and the rest were regular members. All of them, apart from one, tell that there was a lot 
of violence in the milieu. One of the people that had a leader position told that he urged other 
members to commit violence against the “blacks”. Many of the demonstrations also have a 
tendency to escalate into violence. One person told that if you were unafraid and tough, 
wearing symbols in the street and threatening people with violence, it was easier to get high 
status in the group and it was easier to gain respect from the other members, to get acceptance 
from the boys at the top was important for the status in the group, and when the status is high 
the individuals could feel a stronger commitment.  
     When asked about degree of commitment, few of the informants started to talk about 
ideological perspectives, how active they were in spreading the group’s message and how 
dedicated they were in what the group actually stood for. Status and violence were more 
central and they told more about the relationship they had to other people in the group than 
the actual commitment to the ideology. Only two started to talk about actions the group had 
hold in order to spread its message. One of them said that the group for the moment is at war 
with the rest of the society. 
 
6.4 Degree of Commitment: Islamist Extremists 
The people from CENTRIES data material had different degrees of commitment, some were 
very committed, and others were just involved and committed to the groups for a few months. 
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     Rashad Ali said that Hizb-Ut Tahrir had an elected committee and that he was in the 
leadership of the group, that he had a high degree of commitment. Hanif Qadir also said that 
he was committed to the group and the cause. As he got angrier his commitment went further. 
He felt humbled; 
 
 “One Taliban commander wrote to me and accepted me as a supporter of the cause. I 
felt happy and humbled and did more for the cause” 
 
                                                                                                                      Hanif Qadir.  
 
6.5 Ways Out: Right-Wing Extremists 
When asked about reason for why they disengaged from the radical groups many of my 
informants told about how exhausting they felt that the membership became after some time. 
Some told about the constant feeling of paranoia, believing that the police were constantly 
watching them and the group. Growing feelings of discomfort related to the group’s members 
and activity were also mentioned by some of the informants, as well as the feeling that no one 
in the group really trusted you. One said;  
 
“One of the people I knew best came to me and said that he trusted me 20 percent, 
God Damn, I had burnt all bridges, I had no one on the outside, and I was stuck with 
losers that couldn’t read and did not trust me”.  
 
 
 
Negative Social Sanctions 
The consideration to their families was also mentioned by several of the informants as one of 
the reason they started to doubt, negative social sanctions. They saw that their involvement 
was not only affecting them but also their families, especially when they were active in small 
communities where all people knew each other. 
 
Disillusionment 
Some also told about how they started to doubt the group, especially after different 
experiences with people outside of the group, this can be seen under the factor 
disillusionment, the group is not what they thought it to be. One of them told how he met an 
African man;  
 64 
 
“He bought me a beer; I thought that it was poison in the beer, but I started to talk to 
him”.  
 
This person told about how he in the beginning was very reserved and suspicious when it 
came to the African, but that he eventually started to let it go, and that he after this experience 
was left with many questions about the worldview that he had had earlier on. 
     When it comes to the role of the ideology in the process of leaving some of them said that 
they started to doubt the ideology. One said; 
 
 “I started reading `Mein Kampf`, very boring, I understood that this never, never, 
never will happen, war between races, ideologically you feel that you are on the 
loser’s team”.  
 
Acts of Violence 
Despite much violence in the movements few of my informants mentioned acts of violence as 
a direct reason for why they withdraw from the group. This could rather be a trigger in the 
process but other aspect had more to say for the decision to leave.  
 
Rewards 
Several of my informants also mentioned the wish for a family of their own as one of the 
reasons they decided to withdraw. Others said that they understood that the chances of getting 
a good education and a normal job started to decrease if they stayed in the movements. 
     Two of my informants also mentioned military service as one of the reasons why they 
disengaged. In the military they were isolated from their radical milieu, and this enabled them 
to start to think in new ways. One of them also said that with the military service he gained 
more competence since he was a good solider, he said; 
 
 “I think I felt a sense of competence that I did not feel in school. It was an important 
thing in my life then”. 
 
     Even thought my informants mentioned many reasons for disengaging the most central 
reasons were that they got exhausted of being in such movements and that they felt a lack of 
trust in the milieu, that people were talking behind each other’s backs, and the large paranoia 
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that existed within the movements. Many of them also felt that they were tested by the other 
members all the time, to see if they were still committed to the group and to the cause.  
 
Burnout 
Burnout was not mentioned as a direct reason for leaving by any of the informants, but the 
feeling that no one trusted each other within the group was strong for many of them. 
 
6.6 Ways Out: Islamist Extremists 
Many factors were active for the Islamist extremists in the process of leaving as well. Special 
for them was that several saw the ideology as a core-problem and wanted to disengage mainly 
as a consequence. 
 
Negative Social Sanctions 
The Islamist extremists could also experiences negative social sanctions, especially by family 
members who saw that they were getting involved in radical movements. But in the data 
material from CENTRI and the conversations with Hanif Qadir, Rashad Ali and Pat Parry it 
became evident that negative social sanctions are not one of the main reasons for why the 
Islamist extremist withdraw from the groups. 
 
Disillusionment 
Disillusionment on the other hand turned out to have much more to say for Islamist extremist 
disengagement. CENTRI found that when you make the radicals realize that the ideology they 
believe in is false it is easier to get them to deradicalize. It is also important to make them 
realize that the religious dimension is incorrect and falsely based upon misreading of the 
scripture. Realizing that what they used to believe in was colored by disillusionment was 
important for many of the radicals in the decision to leave, they were challenged on their 
views and started to have thoughts of doubt in regard to the radical group or gang, and the 
ideology in it. 
     Rashad Ali said that the same three things that lead him into the group, lead him out, 
religion, identity and politics. He started reflect on these issues and as a consequence he 
started to doubt Hizb ut- Tahrir and their ideology. He said; 
 
 “The politics you realize is a utopian idea, Totalitarian”.  
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He also realized that the connection between the religion and the politics was very 
week. He said;  
 
“You have these debates and discussions and you start to realize things”. 
 
 He started to question the ideas of morality, and he understood that the group was not able to 
deal with that. As a consequence he decided to leave and in the process he also talked to 
several others in the group and made them leave as well. 
         
Acts of Violence 
Hanif Qadir had an experience when he was in Afghanistan that can be connected to both 
disillusionment and acts of violence. Hanif Qadir said that when he came to Afghanistan he 
saw the tactic behind Taliban and Al-Qu´ida, and how they influenced young people. Hanif 
Qadir saw that they treated young children bad. Al-Qu´ida, was not the ones he though them 
to be, he said; “[…] it was not humane or according to Islam”.  
     He had an argument with people in Afghanistan, which were connected to the group, on 
how the Taliban treated people as they were worthless. He understood that the two side were 
wrong, the Taliban and Al Qu`ida as well as the Americans. He decided to leave Afghanistan, 
and withdrew as a consequence from the radical milieu.  
 
Rewards 
Rewards are in the literature found to have relevance for the decision to leave, but from the 
material from CENTRI and the people I interviewed rewards was not mentioned as an 
important factor. 
 
Burnout 
Burnout was not mentioned by any of the informants or in the data material from CENTRI as 
relevant for the process of leaving the movement.  
 
6.7 The Relevance of the Deradicalization Efforts: Right-Wing Extremists 
From the interviews it became clear that if people had negative experiences with the police 
earlier they had a more negative base when the police started having preventive conversations 
with them. They were used to the police as being the enemy and had troubles with changing 
 67 
this view. Some of them went into the conversations with the police with very negative 
attitudes. One of the informants said; 
 
 “I couldn´t take them seriously. The conversations had nothing to say, they 
contributed to me staying longer [in the group]. I didn´t want to be pressured by the 
police”.  
 
This person had had very negative experiences with the police earlier, he had experiences 
where he felt that the police did not help him, when he was very young, and this affected his 
will to cooperate during the conversations. Despite this person’s negative experience with the 
conversations, the person later disengaged from the milieu.  
     The two people that are still active in the movements, despite involvement in 
deradicalization efforts, both said that the deradicalization effort they were put through did 
not “work” for them. Both these people must be said to have relatively indoctrinated views, 
and when asked about the ideology they gave the impression that they had read a lot and that 
they “knew” what their group stood for. Both must be said to be very committed to their 
group, and this could be some of the reason for why the deradicalization efforts did not work 
on them.  
     Of the nine people interviewed, five of them said that the preventive conversation and 
other deradicalization efforts were helpful. The two people that are still active in their 
movements and the person with negative experiences with the police said that the 
deradicalization efforts did nothing for them in regard to staying or leaving, one of them 
proclaimed that he even stayed longer as a consequence of it. 
     Common for many of the informants was that they had already started a process with 
doubt before they got involved in deradicalization efforts. Two of them took contact with the 
different efforts themselves, EXIT, to get assistance to get out of the movements. One of them 
told; 
 
 “I was already on my way, but what supported me was talking to people that had 
been in the same situation and [EXIT use some people that have been involved in 
radical movements themselves to make others disengage] not be judged and seen as 
someone that is crazy. To be met with respect and understanding was important”.   
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Others told about how the police kept an eye on them and that they after some time started to 
develop a relation to them; 
 
 “I understood that they were nice, that they wanted to help me and not take me, they 
wanted the best for me…If they hadn´t been nice and showed that they were there to 
help me, I would have hated them…” 
 
Many of the informant’s mentioned how the conversations with The Norwegian Police 
Security Service, PST, made them reflect on issues with the ideology without attacking them 
because of what they stood for, but rather start a reflection around the issues and get a 
discussion about it. This was important since discussions in the movements often did not 
happen, and there were also a certain chance for getting frozen out when starting a discussion 
about sensitive issues. An informant said this about the preventive conversations; “It opened 
my eyes; I´m going down in the ditch. It is possible to get out. It started a process”.  
     Others also told that the help that they got were crucial for getting them back into society, 
both the preventive conversation and other kinds of support from EXIT; 
 
 “Exit helped me; I was already on my way, what supported me was talking to people 
that had been in the same situation”.  
 
When doing the interview several told about the need to feel that the police are someone you 
can talk to and trust, instead of feeling that they are attacking you because of what you believe 
in. The people that felt, during the preventive conversations, that they were attacked somehow 
had more negative experiences in regard to the whole deradicalization effort.  
     Some of them also told about the importance of getting followed up in the aftermath of the 
disengagement;  
 
“When you are to establish a so called “normal” life it appear as very boring, zero 
excitement, zero crime… It took some time to get to know normal “people” it is such 
emptiness, now what? We were jerks, but maybe it was better to be there”?  
 
 Few of my informants said that the preventive conversations were the only reason for why 
they disengaged; many components were involved in the process. Nevertheless, of the nine 
people I interviewed seven of them meet the three factors over a successful deradicalization 
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program, 1. No execution of violence 2. No re-joining of the radical organization 3. Non-
involvement with members of the radical organization.  
 
     6.8 The Relevance of the Deradicalization Efforts: Islamist Extremists 
Hanif Qadir, who had not been through a deradicalization program himself, but are today 
working with people that are on their way to disengaging, said that religion plays a big part in 
the deradicalization process, and that it is important to use religion in this process for it to be 
as successful as possible. If people are showed that what they used to believe in is wrong they 
will change their views because you cannot believe in something that you know is not the 
truth.  
     Hanif Qadir said that in his experience what can make them deradicalize is to make them 
realize that they have misunderstood religion. If you get them to realize this, the 
deradicalization efforts can be very helpful. The Koran can be used to make them see where 
they got it wrong; you actually have a place to point at, the right answer. When the radicals 
realize that they have got it wrong it is easier for them to withdraw from the milieu, and in 
Hanif Qadir´s experience many of them are able to withdraw after being guided at places like 
the ACF, and the majority of them will meet the criteria’s for success with deradicalization 
programs used in this thesis; 1. No execution of violence 2. No re-joining of the radical 
organization 3.Non-involvement with members of the radical organization. But first of all the 
radicals must have a willingness to see things in another way. 
     Pat Parry said that there is a bigger success rate with the people that gets into 
deradicalization efforts early in their radical “career”, that it is easier to change their radical 
views if these are not that indoctrinated yet. 
    
7.0 Ways In and Ways Out  
In this thesis processes with radicalization and deradicalization has been explored, with a 
main focus on the difference between Right-wing extremist and Islamist extremist in the 
process of disengaging/deradicalizing. I created nine hypotheses and with basis in the data 
material I can verify hypothesis, H1: Individuals that get recruited to extremist movements 
lack a clear identity.  The identity aspect turned out to be important for radicalization into 
both groups, as many of these people often are young people that can feel that they do not 
belong. The radical movements can provide an identity for them. 
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     The second hypothesis, H2: Ideology can be a good source to identity, is also verified. As 
seen people that are searching for their identity can “find” it in ideology, this is especially 
evident for the Islamist extremists, which can find identity in religion. The third hypothesis in 
this thesis, H3: Experiences of grievance can make it easier to get radicalized, is also verified. 
This hypothesis was found as relevant for radicalization for both extremist groups, but was 
found to be of special relevance for the Islamist extremists.   
     Found in this thesis to have relevance for the radicalization process was also personal 
victimization, therefore the fourth hypothesis is also verified, H4: People that have 
experiences with personal victimization can easier get radicalized. 
     The fifth hypothesis also gets verified, H5: Prolonged membership in a radical group 
makes the individuals more radical. In both groups there were signs that prolonged 
membership made the radicals even more radical, much as a growing unity and friends in the 
group. The sixth hypothesis, H6: Deradicalization/disengagement could be especially difficult 
for those in groups with a religious ideology, is the first hypothesis to get falsified. This 
falsification is however drawn with caution due to the different data collection that was done 
in this thesis, that the information from the two groups was collected so differently. However, 
from the data I collected and the data from CENTRI it became evident that the differences in 
deradicalization between the two groups may not be that great after all. The individuals in the 
groups believe in different versions of the reality and these versions can be equally 
indoctrinated despite the fact that one of the ideologies inhibits religious factors. 
     The seventh hypothesis gets verified, H7: Negative social sanctions are of special 
importance for deradicalization for Right-wing extremists. Negative social sanctions could 
have relevance for Islamist extremists as well, but according to the data collected it was more 
important in the process of leaving for the Right-wing extremists than for the Islamist 
extremists. Several of the Right-wing extremists mentioned it as very important for why they 
started the process of withdrawing. 
     The eight hypothesis also gets verified, H8: Disillusionment is one of the most important 
factors for deradicalization for both Right-wing extremists and Islamist extremists. 
Disillusionment was found to be one of the most important factors for both groups when they 
decided to withdraw from the groups. For the Islamist extremists this factor was especially 
important. 
   The ninth hypothesis is falsified, H9: Rewards is important for deradicalization for both 
Right-wing extremist and Islamist extremists. This falsification is however done with doubt as 
rewards were found to have importance in the process connected to leaving for the Right-
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wing extremists. It was however not found to have relevance for the Islamist extremists in the 
process of leaving and must as a consequence get falsified.  
 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
 The mission of this thesis has been threefold. The three research questions were:  
 
1. What Explains Ways Into Extremism? 
2. What Explains Ways Out of Extremism? 
3. Are these processes different or the same for Islamists extremists as for Right-wing 
extremists? 
 
I found that many components are active in the process of getting radicalized into extremist 
movements; the most important factors found in this thesis were, Identity seeking which 
showed to be important for both Right-wing and Islamist extremists in the decision to join a 
radical group. Relevant in the identity seeking process lays also the ideological perspectives, 
which were found to be of special importance for the radicalization of the Islamists 
extremists. Political grievance was also found to have relevance for both groups, again was 
this factor of special importance for the Islamist extremists. Personal victimization was also 
found to have relevance for both groups. Joining a radical group can also be easier if people 
know other people that are active in the group. If they establish a “good” network within the 
group it makes it even harder to withdraw form it; this was found in both groups. Rewards, 
Monetary and status was also found to be relevant for radicalization, but this factor was not 
found to be the most relevant, and it was only some of the informants from the Right-wing 
extremists that mentioned it as important and then in connection to status. 
     In the ways out of the radical movements I found several factors that can be relevant in the 
process. From my data material I found that the Right-wing extremists seems to withdraw 
from the groups due to positive social ties, the wish to get a family and establish a “normal” 
life, in a bigger extent than the Islamists extremists. Disillusionment, that they start to doubt 
what the group believe in, seems on the other hand to be relevant for leaving from both 
groups, and if they are given assistance in the process of disillusionment the chances increase 
that they will leave. The disillusionment could appear after spending time with the group, as 
in Hanif Qadirs case, after different personal experiences, like the informant that met the 
African that bought him a beer, and also in the beginning of the deradicalization efforts when 
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the radicals are challenged on their views. Burnout from the movements was not found as 
relevant for the deradicalization in any of the movements 
     Found in both groups in the process of deradicalization was also the importance of 
deradicalization at an early point, both in matters of age and involvement in the groups. The 
younger they are (Pat Parry said that the age-group 15-25 were easier to deradicalize) the 
easier it is to guide them in the right direction, and the earlier they are “taken” in the 
radicalization process the more likely it is that they will deradicalize. Pat Parry also said that 
it is important to deradicalize them before they get extreme in the sense that they are willing 
to commit terror attacks for example, this counts for both groups. 
      In deradicalizing extremists it has also, on both sides, proven to be effective to use people 
that have a past in radical milieus themselves. These people have a unique insight into the 
milieus and can easier gain respect from the radials. For those who are working with the 
deradicalization of Islamist it can also be of special importance that they are familiar with 
Islam, that they are Muslims themselves. 
     Similarities or differences between the two radical groups has been the third focus of this 
thesis and from the people I have interviewed and from the data material from CENTRI I do 
not find any indications for that religion makes it harder for Islamist extremists to 
deradicalize
22
.  
     The people in the two radical groups are all bound by an extremist mindset, and 
extremisms nature is the same, regardless of religion, whether they see themselves as 
Muslims or Christians, Islamists or Right-wings (Davies 2008). Huntington (1993) claim that 
religious differences are more fundamental than differences in political ideologies 
(Huntington 1993), but does that imply that people that are involved in radical groups with a 
religious ideology have a harder time withdrawing from it?  Both sides, Right-wing extremists 
and Islamist extremists, are extreme and accept extreme methods to reach their goals. When it 
comes to religious extremism, is it just convenient for us to blame religion? And is it 
convenient for those groups to hide behind a religious agenda? For most extreme groups it is a 
struggle for power, stemming from perhaps greed or fear, or both. They both believe in 
versions of something, and as Pat Parry said, these versions can be equally indoctrinated in 
each group, no matter if the versions takes its starting point in religion or not. If these versions 
are equally indoctrinated, is it then a difference in withdrawing from the groups? With the 
right help and assistance, there may not be such a huge difference in withdrawing from the 
                                                 
22
 It is however important to keep in mind that the radicals have gotten different degrees of assistance in the 
process of leaving their groups, this could have relevance for the answers that they gave. 
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groups after all, for as Eiternes and Fangen (2002) claims; the Right-wing extremists 
conviction can be as strong as the conviction to religious fundamentalists (Eiternes & Fangen 
2002: 60). 
     The difference between them is more about what kind of tools that could be used in the 
deradicalization process, and how effective these tools prove to be. Hanif Qadir meant that 
deradicalization actually could be easier when you have religion to use to show the radicals 
where they got it wrong. Hanif Qadir said that religion is a huge advantage in the 
deradicalization of Islamist extremists. He meant that religion can make it easier in a 
deradicalization process since it is possible to listen to the radicals views and point directly to 
where they got it wrong using the Koran. In the deradicalization of Right-wing extremists 
there is no such advantage and Hanif Qadir meant that this can make it harder in the process 
with deradicalization.  
     Pat Parry said that in his experience what made a difference in deradicalization or not had 
nothing to do with what group the radicals were from, factors like age and degree of 
commitment in the groups had much more to say.  
     If one assumes that the radicals from each side have the same level of commitment in the 
group and are given the same help to disengage, there are no factors that indicate that 
deradicalization should be harder for the Islamists extremists. 
     This is much to my surprise as I when starting writing on this thesis actually expected the 
opposite to be true. I read Rabsasa et al (2010), where they claim that it is harder to 
deradicalize Islamist extremists than other radical groups, believing they had already got the 
right answer. Now, I wonder whether this is a “false” assumption or not. When doing the 
interviews it appeared clearer and clearer to me; it does not seem like it is harder for Islamist 
extremist to deradicalize than other extreme groups. Where is this possible “false” assumption 
coming from? Is it convenient to blame religion? Do we fear religious extremism more since 
they tend to get the most attention? Although the data gathered here is much too small to give 
any definite answer, I feel the following hypothesis needs to be thrown out: the nature of 
extremism is the same, and withdrawing from it is also the same, no matter if God is included 
or not – thus is the process of leaving it behind. 
 
7.2 Policy Implications 
If one is to believe the different reports evolving terrorism, for example Te-Sat, extremism 
and terrorism threats are not decreasing; it is therefore a need to explore ways leading to 
deradicalization further. In this analysis I found that certain factors are associated with 
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radicalization, where the lack of identity seems to be of particular importance. Thus efforts at 
an early stage – preventing feeling of loneliness, awkwardness, “out-group-ness” should be 
high on the political agenda. Deradicalization programs and especially the conversations, 
preventive conversations, have had an effect when used both at Right-wing extremists in 
Norway and Sweden and Islamists extremist in the UK. In both the groups I found that the 
radical people often needed someone to talk to and that they during such conversations were 
challenged on their views, potentially starting a reflection process for them. 
     Found just as important for both sides when doing preventive conversations was that the 
conversations were not of a judging character. It is very important to make the individuals 
understand that they may have got some wrong perspective, without attacking them and 
blaming them for being stupid and naive. These findings were relevant both for the people I 
spoke to in Norway, Sweden and the ones in the UK.  
     In addition to having non-judgmental but challenging conversations, alternatives to the 
extremist routes also seem to be important. Networks of friends, family and a job or a place to 
stay aside from the extremist group are very important to get people out of these milieus. 
     A wide range of countries are today already drawing on experiences from each other when 
it comes to the deradicalization programs, and several of the above mentioned factors are 
present (Regjeringen Handlingsplan 2010). Yet, more systematic cooperation across countries 
and groups are needed if we want to truly understand the mechanisms behind both the ways in 
–as well as- the ways out of these organizations, and potentially differences between various 
types of extremism. This leads me to the final section: further research. 
                                                                                                                                                     
7.3 Further Research 
 
“One of the most glaring gaps in the literature is the failure to examine the 
similarities and differences between Islamist militants and other types of extremism 
and to determine the implications of these findings for the process of disengagement 
and deradicalization”  
 
                                                                                  (Rabasa et al 2010: 26). 
 
This thesis has been a modest and first attempt in that regard. There are however still 
tremendous needs to do more research in this area, since the issue is of such a big character, 
and since we want to prevent extremism and terrorism in the future. To discover even more 
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reasons for why individuals eventually choose to cut the thread to their radical groups is of 
great importance because this can enable further development of deradicalization programs, 
and with them hopefully more people will get deradicalized. 
     As of today there is a huge lack of comparable data on the field, and efforts to collect more 
are needed, especially data material over success with the programs, how big the repetition 
rate is and which factors that has the most effects in the processes. In that way it can get easier 
to compare the different programs as well as seeing what components that works and which 
do not and in what settings. In that way it could also be easier for countries to borrow ideas 
around deradicalization from each other. 
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9.0 Appendix 
 
Information Paper 
I am a student in political science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. I 
am writing my master thesis about deradicalization of extremists, whether it is harder to 
deradicalize Islamists versus Right-wing extremists. I am interviewing people that have been 
through different deradicalization programs, have been radicals or are working with 
deradicalization in Norway and the United Kingdom. The interviews are essential for my 
thesis. I can guarantee full anonymity for my interview objects. The interview will take 
around 30-45 minutes. 
Information that is collected 
The information that is collected is based on the different people’s entry and exit into and 
from different radical milieus. The main goal is to find out what characterizes deradicalization 
from different groups. The information that is collected is to be used in the analysis part of the 
paper. 
     The interviews are personal and will last from 30 – 60 minutes. There will be taken written 
notes during the interviews. The informants can withdraw from the project any time without 
giving a reason for it, as long as the study is in progress. The survey is reported to Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services, NSD.  
For more information I can be reached on telephone: +4747051954 or email: 
hoigard@stud.ntnu.no. My supervisor at NTNU can also be contacted, telephone +47 73 59 
19 00 or email: Tanja.Ellingsen@svt.ntnu.no 
Best regards, Kirsti Tajet Høigård 
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Informasjonsskriv 
Forespørsel om å delta i intervju i forbindelse med masteroppgave 
Om prosjektet 
Jeg er en student i statsvitenskap ved Norges Tekniske og Naturvitenskapelige Universitet. 
Jeg skal skrive masteroppgave om avradikalisering av ekstremister, og sammenligne om det 
er vanskeligere å avradikalisere en Islamist i forhold til en høyre-ekstrem. I den sammenheng 
trenger jeg å gjennomføre intervjuer av personer i Norge som tidligere har vært tilknyttet 
høyre-ekstreme miljøer, og som har vært gjennom ulike former for avradikalisering. 
Opplysningene som innhentes vil bukes i min masteroppgave som er tenkt ferdig i mai/juni 
2012. 
Opplysninger som innhentes 
Opplysningene som innhentes vil basere seg på de ulike personenes inntreden til de ulike 
miljøene og hvordan og hvorfor de trakk seg ut, og om de fremdeles har noe kontakt med 
miljøet. Hovedformålet er å måle hvordan avradikalisering fungerer og hva som kjennetegner 
avradikalisering fra ulike grupper. Personidentifiserende informasjon er ikke vesentlig i 
intervjuene, og vil heller ikke bli vektlagt. Opplysningen som innhentes skal brukes i 
analysedelen i min masteroppgave. 
     Innhentingen av informasjon vil foregå ved personlig intervju som vil vare fra 15-45 
minutter, eventuelt telefonintervju. Det vil muligens bli brukt lydopptaker ved intervjuene 
hvis informantene synes dette er greit. Det vil og bli tatt skriftlige notater. Opplysningene fra 
intervju lagres på bærbar pc. Det vil under intervjuene ikke bli innhentet data som er av 
personidentifiserbar karakter, derfor vil heller ikke slik data bli lagret noe sted. 
Intervjuobjektene kan når som helst og uten grunn velge å trekke seg så lenge studien pågår. 
Undertegnede er underlagt taushetsplikt og prosjektet er meldt til Personvernombudet for 
forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS. 
For nærmere opplysninger kan jeg kontaktes på telefon: 47051954 eller mail: 
hoigard@stud.ntnu.no. Min veileder ved NTNU kan og kontaktes på telefon: 73 59 19 00 
eller mail: Tanja.Ellingsen@svt.ntnu.no 
Vennlig hilsen Kirsti Tajet Høigård 
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Interview Guide 
About the Thesis 
I am a student in political science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. I 
am writing my master thesis about deradicalization of extremists, whether it is harder to 
deradicalize Islamists versus Right-wing extremists. I am interviewing people that have been 
through different deradicalization programs, have been radicals or are working with 
deradicalization in Norway and the United Kingdom. The interviews are essential for my 
thesis. I can guarantee full anonymity for my interview objects. The interview will take 
around 30-45 minutes. 
 
Questions: 
1. Name, gender and age. (Do not need to answer this) 
2. What organization were you a member of? 
3. How did you get in contact with the group? 
4. Why did you become a member? 
5. How important was the ideology/religion for becoming a member? 
6. What kind of views did you agree with the group on? 
7. How long were you a member?  
8. How committed were you in the group? Status in the group and commitment of 
violence?  
9. What lead to your disengagement from the group?  
- Family  
- The Police 
- Deradicalization programs 
- Preventive conversations 
10. Have you changed your values and thoughts after leaving the group? 
11. Do you still have contact with the group you were active in? 
12. Do you still have friends in the group? 
13. Could you become a member again? 
14. How helpful were the programs in the process of leaving? 
15. What in the programs were useful? 
16. Did your religion make it more difficult to leave the group? 
17. Have your religious belief and values changed after leaving the group? 
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18. Do you have anything else to say about the membership and the leaving process that 
you want to add? 
 
Additional questions to those working with deradicalization: 
1. What is the challenge in deradicalizing Islamist extremists? 
2. What is important to do so that people stay disengaged? 
3.  Does religion play a big part in the Islamist extremist’s ideology? Or is politics as 
big? 
4.  Do you think extremists that are bound to religion as ideology have a harder time 
deradicalizing?   
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Quotes from the Interviews in Norwegian 
“Det jeg tror de tilbød meg var en følelse av å være overlegen. Det var en følelse jeg virkelig 
trengte”. 
“Jeg trengte et sted å være”. 
“Heller en å gå og kjøpe en pistol, fant jeg ut at det var bedre å ta kontakt med folk som hadde 
peiling”  
 “Hvis man slenger hakekors opp i trynet på folk blir man sett, da får man masse 
oppmerksomhet”.  
“Ustabilt hjemme hadde mye med saken å gjøre, hadde mye aggresjon i meg, dårlig selvbilde, 
ekstremt negative tanker om meg selv, klarte ikke å passe inn, fryst ut og mobbet på skolen. 
Gikk mye rundt for meg selv og ønsket at jeg hadde venner” 
“Jeg søkte spenning og tilhørighet”.  
”Hvis hele samfunnet sier at det som gjøres i gruppa di er voldelig, når mediene sier at det 
bare er tapere der, da kommer de voldelige taperne til deg”. 
”Jeg kan huske at noen sa at det bare var tapere der, jeg tenkte at der passer jeg inn”. 
“Etterhvert hører du så mange ganger at du er en høyre-ekstrem at før du vet det, er du en”.   
 “Det var et asylmottak i nærheten av der jeg bodde, det var mye opptøyer der og jeg ville at 
folk skulle være med på laget mot svartingene”. 
  “Det handler mer om følelser enn ideologi når man blir høyre-ekstrem. Miljøet blir en 
følelsesmessig ventil, man har ulike negative følelser i kroppen og disse må ut på en eller 
annen måte”.  
 “Fakta er at ideologien spilte veldig liten rolle, jeg tror at jeg ville blitt med i hva som helst. 
Den gangen trodde jeg det var ideologen som drev meg. Helt ærlig, jeg tror at hvis jeg ble 
kjent med satanister eller noen som drev med dop hadde jeg sikkert begynt å henge med dem i 
stedet eller en religiøs sekt, hvis jeg hadde møtt en karismatisk person som så meg og viste at 
jeg var velkommen”. 
“Gjentok bare ting han sa, som han hadde printa inn i hodet mitt. Det var ikke jeg som 
snakka, det var han”. 
“Jeg kunne aldri blitt med i en organisasjon som ikke deler mitt nasjonal sosialistiske syn, jeg 
tror på ideologien og det er derfor jeg ble medlem”.  
 
“Det skjer en radikalisering, ting man trodde var utenkelig når man først ble medlem i gruppa 
blir etterhvert normalt, i begynnelsen var det noen barrierer”.  
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“Vi skulle på konsert og så en afrikansk mann som hvor en av de jeg kjente bare liksom, slo 
han ganske brutalt ned, da var vi liksom.. vi forvant videre.. det eneste vi tenkte var så kult, 
når jeg teker på det nå er det helt jævlig, men den gange var det ingen tanker om anger eller 
ubehag ved å være vitne til det”.      
“En av dem jeg kjente best kom og sa at jeg stoler på deg 20%, fy faen liksom, jeg har brent 
alle broer, jeg har ingen på utsiden, og så er det bare loosers som knapt kan lese og som ikke 
stoler på meg”. 
 “Han kjøpte en øl til meg, jeg tenkte at det sikker var gift i ølen, men jeg begynte å snakke 
med han...” 
“Når makteliten i landet vil utrydde nordmenn som etnisk gruppe, må det skapes en motvekt 
slik at vi kan få tilbake Norge”. 
“Jeg begynte å lese mein kamp, utrolig kjedelig, jeg skjønte at dette aldri aldri aldir kommer 
til å skje noe, rasekrigen osv. også ideologisk sett, du føler at du er med på taperlaget, dette er 
utopi, jeg hadde tanker om tvil”.. 
“Jeg klarte ikke å ta dem seriøst. Samtalene hadde ingenting å si, de bidro heller til at jeg ble 
lenger i gruppa. Jeg ville ikke bli presset av politiet”.  
 “Jeg forstod at de var hyggelige, at de ville hjelpe meg og ikke ta meg, de ville det beste for 
meg… Hvis de ikke hadde vært snille og vist meg at de ville hjelpe meg, ville jeg ha hatet 
dem…” 
    “Fikk øynene mine opp. Her er jeg på vei ned i grøfta. Det er mulig å komme seg ut. Satte i 
gang prosessen”.         
“Når man skal lage seg et såkalt vanlig liv, fremstår det som veldig kjedelig, null spenning, 
null kriminalitet… det tok tid å bli kjent med vanlige mennesker, det blir en sånn tomhet, hva 
nå? Vi var duster, men kanskje det var bedre å være der”? 
 
Quotes from the Media, translated from Norwegian to English 
“I mange av disse tilfellene kunne jeg valgt å slåss tilbake og ta loven i egne hender og skadet 
mange av disse muslimene, men jeg tenkte at det ikke var hensiktsmessig, jeg så på slike 
mennesker som dyr” (Behring Breivik 2012).  
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